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The dissertation is composed of three related essays 
on the microstructure of financial markets. The first 
extends the work of Glosten and Milgrom [23] by examining 
prices in a market where dealers are heterogeneous and 
information is distributed asymmetrically across market 
p a r t i c i p a n t s .
The second essay is an examination of some of the 
special pricing problems faced by dealers in the options 
market. Particular attention is given to the 
consequences of instaneously perfect correlation in the 
expected returns of options on the same underlying 
equity. This relation is shown to imply a systematic 
relation among the bid-ask spreads for such options as 
well as having consequences for the inferrence of bid-ask 
spreads from transaction prices. Each of these 
implications is subjected to empirical investigation.
The final essay is an attempt to apply a model of 
dealer pricing in an empirical analysis of the mechanism 
by which information is incorporated in market prices.
At this point, the results are best viewed as preliminary 




One of the more striking features of the price 
system is the economy of knowledge afforded by the 
efficiency with which market prices aggregate diffuse 
information. While financial markets more nearly 
approximate the conditions under which prices would be 
expected to accurately summarize aggregate supply and 
demand conditions, they remain subject to important 
sources of trade inhibiting friction. Nonsynchronous 
arrival of buy and sell orders virtually assures that the 
most recent transaction price is not the 'true1 market 
clearing price. Furthermore, information processing 
being a costly activity, market participants are likely 
to be asymmetrically informed.
Despite these impediments to trade, a large body of 
evidence suggests that prices in financial markets 
respond quite rapidly to new information. It could be 
argued that this is true largely as a result of the 
evolution of market structures and intermediaries that 
economize the transactions costs introduced by market 
imperfections. In many securities markets intermediation 
between buyers and sellers takes the form of a dealer 
standing ready to take the opposite side of incoming 
market orders. Presumably the dealer provides an
efficient alternative to searching for an appropriate 
trading partner as well as serving as a repository for 
information about current market conditions.*
An important cost faced by traders in such markets is
the spread between the bid price at which the dealer is
willing to buy and the ask price at which he will sell.
This cost, referred to as the bid-ask spread, is the
focal point of an extensive literature concerned with the
'microstructure' of financial markets. The literature
has implications for both the operational efficiency and,
perhaps more importantly, the informational efficiency of
2financial markets.
Recent efforts to understand how private information 
is incorporated in market prices have focused on how 
information might be revealed through the trading 
behavior of market participants. Recognizing that market 
imperfections and the transactions costs associated with 
them tend to inhibit trade, the link between operational 
and informational efficiency becomes obvious. One goal 
of this dissertation is to provide additional insight 
into the nature of this link. In particular, an attempt 
is n\ade to provide empirical content to the notion that 
the informational efficiency of a market is inexorably 
linked to the costs of exchange. Theories of pricing 
behavior developed in the microstructure literature
provide the analytical framework for addressing this 
issue.
In addition to having much to say about the 
operational and informational efficiency of a market, the 
magnitude of the bid-ask spread carries information about 
the elasticity of market supply and demand curves. In 
the world of perfect substitutes on which arbitrage 
theories of financial asset pricing are founded market 
supply and demand is perfectly elastic. In other words, 
a single price exists at which any quantity may be 
traded. Thus, the magnitude of the bid-ask spread 
provides insight into the extent to which market 
conditions diverge from those under which arbitrage 
pricing theories are derived.^
As a practical matter, a number of financial assets 
would be perfect substitutes for one another were it not 
for the presence of transactions costs such as the bid- 
ask spread. For example, it is possible to construct 
levered positions in an equity option which provide 
risk/return profiles identical to that of the underlying 
equity as well as any other option on the equity. Such 
redundancies are viable in the presence of differences 
among the (transactions) costs of constructing identical 
risk/return positions. Thus, the existence of seemingly 
redundant securities implies an endogenously determined
cost structure describing the relation between the costs 
of transacting in such securities.
A second goal of this dissertation is to take an 
initial step toward understanding this relation between 
transactions costs in markets for related securities. 
Pursuit of this goal focuses attention on a number of 
questions concerning the links between markets for 
stocks, stock options, and stock index futures. Answers 
to such questions take on added importance in the 
aftermath of the October, 1987 market collapse. A major 
insight emerging from the collapse is the apparent need 
to analyze individual markets within the institutional 
fabric in which they are embedded and through which they 
are linked to one another. The analyses presented here 
follow this insight.
The body of the dissertation is composed of three 
essays addressing the issues proposed above (Chapters 
III-V). To provide a context for these essays, Chapter 
II offers a review of the segment of the microstructure 
literature concerned with the determinants of the bid-ask 
spread. Chapter VI provides a brief discussion of the 
conclusions of the three essays as well as directions for 
future research
The first essay (Chapter III) examines market prices 
in a heterogeneous dealer market when information is
asymmetrically distributed across market participants.
As such, it is a direct extension of Glosten and 
Milgrom's [23] analysis of a market where trade is 
conducted through a representative dealer (competitive 
specialist).
The issue of dealer heterogeneity is generally 
considered to be of second order importance to analyses 
of the determinants of market prices. As a consequence 
little attention has been given to the empirical 
implications of applying models of specialist behavior to 
competitive dealer markets. Given that the empirical 
analyses in the second and third essays are conducted 
with data from competitive dealer markets, this issue 
takes on somewhat greater importance in the present 
context. The focus of the first essay is on those 
implications that would appear to be of greatest 
importance to the empirical analyses to follow.
The third essay (Chapter V) is an empirical analysis 
of the cost and means of market adjustment to the arrival 
of new information. The existing empirical literature 
concerned with the informational efficiency of securities 
markets generally takes market structure as given and 
focuses on the speed with which market prices adjust to 
new information. The microstructure literature has 
advanced to the point where it lends much insight into
the mechanism by which price adjustment occurs through 
trade as well as the cost of such adjustment. Since much 
trade in securities markets is conducted through 
dealers, market adjustment to new information will be 
reflected in the magnitude, location, and composition of 
the bid-ask spread. The third essay is an analysis of 
the characteristics of a security's bid-ask spread during 
periods containing the release of an earnings 
announcement. As such, it stands as an attempt to 
empirically investigate the relation between operational 
and informational efficiency.
One special feature of the third essay is that it is 
conducted with data drawn from the competitive market 
making system of the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE). The analysis of information events is typically 
conducted within the stock market. However, as Black [7] 
suggests, there is reason to believe that information 
disseminated through trade is likely to arrive in the 
options market first.
However, options and the markets in which they are 
traded exhibit special characterisitics which make the 
option dealer's pricing problem somewhat different from 
that of the dealer in the stock market. The second essay 
(Chapter IV) can be viewed as an investigation of some of 
the special pricing problems encountered by dealers in
the options market and their implications for relative 
pricing within a class of options on a common underlying 
stock .
More importantly, the relatively advanced state of 
option pricing theory makes the options market a useful 
laboratory for examining the link between transactions 
costs for related securities. Within the context of the 
options market, the second essay derives implications for 
the relation between bid-ask spreads for related 
securities which suggest an unusually direct test of an 
existing theory of dealer pricing behavior. In addition 
to carrying out this test, it is demonstrated that 
attention to cross-security relations can improve our 
ability to infer the bid-ask spread from transaction 
prices using the existing technology for spread 
estimation. A by-product of the analysis is an empirical 
methodology employed in the third essay which is 
consistent with the special nature of these cross­
security relations. Finally, the cross-security 
implications derived in this essay suggest a more general 
model in which transactions costs are endogenously 
determined across markets for related securities.
Taken as a whole, the three essays should reflect the 
relation between the two seemingly unrelated goals 
proposed for the dissertation. Incorporation of private
information in the price of a particular security can be 
the result of activity in either that security or any of 
a number of related securities. Consequently, the cost 
of transacting in any of these securities is likely to 
influence the degree to which prices for any one security 
reflect available information. While this statement is 
quite general, the analysis of an information event 
within the context of the options market will make the 
consequences of inattention to this point more explicit.
Chapter II 
Literature Review
Trade in many financial markets is conducted through 
designated market makers. As Stoll [53] points out, 
these market makers perform several distinct services.
The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the literature 
concerned with the implications of one of these services; 
the provision of dealer services. In his dealer role 
the market maker buys and sells for his own account, as 
opposed to providing the brokerage service of simply 
matching incoming buy and sell orders. In doing so, the 
market maker offsets transitory supply and demand 
imbalances in the market. As compensation for providing 
this service the market maker receives the spread between 
his quoted bid and ask prices.
Within this context it is natural, both theoretically 
and historically, to segment the theoretical literature 
and consider independently the consequences for dealers 
of two sources of market friction: nonsynchronous arrival 
of buy and sell orders and costly information.
Similarly, the empirical literature can be partitioned 
into earlier efforts to explain the cross-sectional 
variation in bid-ask spreads and more recent efforts to 
draw inferences about bid-ask spreads from the relation 
between the time series properties of transaction prices
9
and the bid-ask spread.
Before discussing these four segments of the 
literature it will be useful to develop a simple 
framework for understanding the presence of multiple 
prices in an imperfect market. Here and throughout the 
remainder of the study, ’dealer* is used to refer to any 
market making entity buying and selling for its own 
account. Also, unless otherwise stated, the focus here 
will be on the market bid-ask spread. Defined as the 
spread between the lowest available ask price and the 
highest bid price available in the market, the market 
bid-ask spread more nearly reflects the cost to an 
investor of having a market order executed.
I. Determinants of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory
Stigler [50J was the first to appreciate the 
consequences of a temporally fragmented order flow. In 
particular Stigler notes that random fluctutations in 
demand can lead to deviations between actual prices and 
true equilibrium prices. Stigler contends that 
specialists on the NYSE take advantage of the speculative 
opportunities presented by these price fluctuations. In 
doing so, they contribute to the market's 1resiliance', 
or, its ability to absorb orders without large price 
fluctuations. The return on this speculative activity is 
the specialist's bid-ask spread which in a competitive
equilibrium just offsets opportunity costs and the costs 
of carrying inventory.
The seminal work of Demsetz [16] provides the insight 
that the essence of the service provided by the NYSE 
specialist is the opportunity for immediate execution of 
a market order. A fundamental tenet of elementary 
microeconomic theory holds that 'the1 equilibrium price 
in a market will be determined by the intersection of 
aggregate supply and demand curves. However, as Demsetz 
points out, at any point in time an individual wishing to 
trade at this market clearing price may not find an 
appropriate trading partner waiting in the market.
Searching for a compatible trading partner would 
likely be quite costly to an investor. In addition to 
the direct costs of search, the investor is subject to 
price risk associated with delayed execution (see Garbade 
and Silber [18] ) and the opportunity cost of 
maintaining a suboptimal portfolio during the search 
interval.
In most financial markets the response to this source 
of friction has been the evolution of market systems in 
which a dealer or group of dealers stands ready to sell 
(buy) at prices determined by a supply (demand) curve 
which lies above (below) investors' aggregate supply 
(demand) curve. Thus, the market is characterized by two
equilibrium prices, one for buyers and one for sellers. 
For a price equal to the spread between these two prices 
the dealer eliminates the need for costly searches and 
offers investors the opportunity to equate at the margin 
the costs and benefits of immediate execution.*
In addition to the dealer’s opportunity costs of time 
and capital, providing the service of immediacy is costly 
both because it requires the dealer to maintain 
undesirable levels of inventory and because the dealer 
may be subject to trading with individuals holding 
private information about the future value of the 
security. These two costs have been the focus of much of 
the theoretical literature devoted to understanding the 
determinants of the bid-ask spread. The development of 
this literature is discussed in the following sections.
A. The Dealer's Inventory Problem
Garman [191 was the first to provide a rigorous 
analysis of the inventory management component of the 
dealer's pricing problem. Modelling the stochastic 
(Poisson) arrival of market buy and sell orders as a 
function of a monopolistic dealer's ask and bid prices, 
Garman demonstrates that dealer survival is directly 
related to the dealer's ability to actively manage 
inventory through his pricing strategy. Amihud and
Mendelson [2] extend Garman's analysis to obtain the 
dealer's optimal pricing policy and show that the optimal 
pricing policy implies a preferred inventory position.
In addition to devoting capital to the maintenance 
of inventory, dealers bear risk related to the suboptimal 
inventory positions their role may require them to take. 
Following this insight Stoll [51] develops a model of a 
risk averse expected utility of wealth maximizing 
dealer's cost of providing immediacy. The dealer is 
assumed to have a preferred portfolio which his trading 
activities do not allow him to maintain. One implication 
of the model is an expression for the dealer's optimal 
spread as a function of dealer wealth and risk aversion 
and the security's total risk. The spread reflects 
compensation for the utility loss the dealer incurs when 
he is forced to deviate from his optimal portfolio.
Contrary to the conclusion drawn by Amihud and 
Mendelson [2] and O'Hara and Oldfield [43], the bid-ask 
spread is not a function of current inventory in Stoll's 
model. Rather, the dealer's inventory determines the 
location of the spread about the true price of the 
security. The intuition in this result is that the dealer 
uses the location of his spread to manage deviations from 
his optimal inventory. Thus, for example, positive 
deviations from his optimal inventory induce the dealer
to shift his supply and demand curves downward such that 
reservation bid and ask fees shift downward an equal and 
opposite amount.
In a series of papers which build on Stoll’s earlier 
analysis, Ho and Stoll [30], [31], [32] introduce demand 
uncertainty and consider the multiperiod strategy of the 
dealer in both specialist and competitive dealer markets. 
Similar to Stoll [51], Ho and Stoll demonstrate that 
while reservation bid and ask prices will be functions of 
dealer inventory, the magnitude of the market bid-ask 
spread will not.
A final dimension of the dealer's inventory problem 
is related to the fact that dealers generally are not 
confined to making a market for a single security. When 
a dealer makes a market for several securities whose 
returns are correlated with one another, his pricing 
decisions for the individual securities are not 
independent of one another. Ho and Stoll [32] make this 
point explicit by demonstrating that bid and ask prices 
for an individual security will be related to the 
dealer's net inventory (in risk equivalent units) of all 
the securities for which he makes market. In Chapter IV 
this line of reasoning is shown to have special 
implications for dealers in the options market which 
lead to a direct test of Ho and Stoll's [32] model.
In summary, this segment of the literature suggests 
two broad implications for the market bid-ask spread.
The riskiness of the security held in inventory in 
tandem with dealer risk aversion will be reflected in the 
magnitude of the dealer's spread. On the other hand, the 
nature of the dealer's inventory position relative to 
that which he perceives optimal will be reflected in the 
location of the spread about the true equilibrium price.
B . The Dealer's Adverse Selection Problem
When information gathering and processing is a 
costly endeavor the potential for asymmetric information 
among market participants exists. The seminal work of 
Akerlof [1] provides an analysis of the adverse selection 
problem that exists in this type of market. Using 
similar reasoning, Bagehot [5] suggested an important 
implication for dealer pricing behavior in financial 
markets: when forced to trade with investors perceived to 
be holding private information, the dealer will set a 
higher price for his services to offset the losses he 
expects to incur. Copeland and Galai [14], Glosten and 
Milgrom [23], Easley and O'Hara [17], and Kyle [38] 
formalize this intuition and demonstrate that the 
dealer's bid-ask spread will be a positive function of 
the level of informed trading activity he perceives in 
the market.
Glosten and Milgrom model the behavior of a risk- 
neutral competitive specialist who sets bid and ask 
prices reflecting his expectation of the true price 
conditional on public information and information 
inferred from the next trade being executed at either his 
bid or ask price. Assuming that the specialist knows the 
process defining the arrival of informed and uninformed 
traders, the information he infers from the order flow 
allows^ him to set prices which, on average, offset losses 
to informed traders at the expense of uninformed traders. 
The model implies that as long as the beliefs of informed 
traders and the specialist diverge, this divergence alone 
will induce the dealer to set a positive bid-ask spread. 
Thus, the magnitude of the adverse selection induced 
component of the bid-ask spread is a direct measure of 
the dealer's perception of the degree of informational 
asymmetry in the market.
Given this simple learning model, Glosten [21] 
demonstrates that the portion of bid-ask spreads 
associated with adverse selection is not independent of 
the dealer's inventory problem. The intuition behind 
this result is based on the dealer inferring more from 
transactions at extreme prices. In other words a 
transaction at a relatively high ask price in response to 
an extremely low (or short) inventory position carries
more information than one at a relatively low ask price 
associated with a larger inventory position.
Finally, recall that the discussion from the previous 
section suggested that changes in dealer inventory lead 
to transitory shifts of the spread relative to the true 
price of the security. In contrast, a relocation of the 
spread as a consequence of information inferred from the 
order flow is permanent in the sense that it reflects a 
revision in expectations concerning the security's true 
equilibrium price. This distinction has important 
implications for the time series properties of 
transaction prices. The widely observed negative serial 
correlation in transaction returns is associated with 
transitory price changes which occur when successive 
trades cross the bid-ask spread. As both Glosten and 
Milgrom [23] and Glosten [21] point out, this correlation 
will be damped by permanent price revisions embodied in 
the adverse selection component of the spread. The 
importance of this issue is discussed in more detail in 
Section II.B.
II. Determinants of the Bid-Ask Spread:
Empirical Evidence 
The empirical literature has generally followed one 
of two approaches to testing models of bid-ask spread
determination. Early efforts focused on the cross-
sectional correlation between various measures of the
5spread and variables suggested by theory. Of late, more 
attention has been given to the influence of the bid-ask 
spread on the time series properties of transaction 
prices. The discussion in Sections II.A and II.B follows 
this historical progression.
A. Cross-Sectional Evidence
In addition to providing the theoretical framework 
for much of the work to follow, Demsetz [16] conducted 
the first empirical analysis of the factors determining 
the magnitude of the bid-ask spread. Following his 
theoretical analysis, Demsetz hypothesizes that the 
spread (in dollars per share) will be a positive function 
of the price per share and a negative function of a 
measure of trading activity. The activity variable is a 
proxy for the risk assumed by carrying inventory. When 
the stock is actively traded, the dealer will carry a 
smaller average inventory and consequently bear less 
risk .
Demsetz argues that relative spreads should tend 
toward equality across stocks to eliminate the 
possibility for arbitrage. This argument assumes that 
stocks are near substitutes for one another both in their 
risk characteristics and other costs of transacting
(e.g., commissions). An alternative argument for a 
positive relation between the absolute spread and share 
price involves the dealer's capital commitment per share. 
Higher priced shares require a larger capital commitment 
to fund a given number of shares in inventory. As a 
consequence, other things equal, the dealer faces a 
higher opportunity cost when making market in high priced 
shares.
As hypothesized, closing bid-ask spreads for a cross- 
section of 200 NYSE listed stocks are found to be 
positively correlated with price per share and negatively 
correlated with both the average number of transactions 
per day and the number of shareholders. Demsetz also 
includes in the regression model the number of markets on 
which the stock is listed as a measure of competition 
faced by the NYSE specialist. While the variable enters 
with the expected negative sign, the parameter estimate 
is not significantly different from zero.
Tinic [55] also examines a sample of NYSE stocks and 
finds like Demsetz that closing spreads are positively 
correlated with price and negatively correlated with the 
average number of shares traded daily. Contrary to 
Demsetz's results, Tinic observed a significant negative 
relation between spreads and the level of competition 
(measured by a Herfindahl index).
Somewhat surprisingly, Tinic also finds that 
including the standard deviation of a stock's price 
(a measure of total risk) in his regression model does 
not appear to account for any of the cross-sectional 
variation in closing spreads. Tinic and West [56] draw a 
similar conclusion from a sample of OTC stocks. On the 
other hand Tinic and West [57] find that a measure of 
price volatility is positively correlated with closing 
spreads on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
Benston and Hagerman [6] argue that the expected 
return of a stock should compensate the dealer for 
bearing systematic risk and, thus, only unsystematic risk 
should influence the bid-ask spread. Their evidence from 
the OTC market is consistent with this argument.
Stoll [52] also uses data from the OTC market but
concludes that the relations between the bid-ask spread
and systematic and unsystematic risk are both
statistically significant. While unsystematic risk 
appears to be more important, Stoll argues that total 
risk is relevant. Stoll reasons that market making 
requires the dealer to carry suboptimal levels of 
inventory which lead to a utility loss that is not 
compensated for by the stock's expected return.
The influence of competition on the provision of 
dealer services has also received a good deal of
attention in the literature. Much of this attention has 
been in response to the controversy surrounding the costs 
and benefits of a national market system. As Hamilton 
[25] suggests, if market makers face significant economies 
of scale, fragmenting the market for a security by 
introducing alternative marketplaces may actually reduce 
the efficiency with which dealer services are provided. 
Studying the influence of regional exchange and OTC 
listing of NYSE stocks, Hamilton concludes that the 
effects of both fragmentation and competition are small 
but that the benefits of competition outweigh the costs 
of fragmentation.
In general, the evidence appears to support the 
conclusion that competition reduces the bid-ask spread.
In addition to Tinic [55], Branch and Freed [9] find 
that the spread for NYSE stocks is negatively related to 
the number of exchanges on which the stock is listed.
Neal [41] reports similar evidence for a sample of 
multiple listed options. Consistent with the theory of 
contestable markets, Neal finds that even when trading 
volume is concentrated on a single exchange, multiple 
listed options have significantly lower bid-ask spreads.
Similarly, Tinic and West [56], Benston and Hagerman 
[6], and Stoll [52] all conclude that spreads for OTC 
stocks are negatively related to the number of dealers
making market in the stock. Stoll also observes that 
spreads are larger when trade is dominated by a single 
dealer.
In summary, the evidence provided by the body of 
cross-sectional analyses is generally consistent with 
theories of the determinants of bid-ask spreads. Bid-ask 
spreads appear to be positively correlated with price 
levels and variables that proxy for dealer risk. 
Competition, real or potential, appears to reduce bid-ask 
spreads. Furthermore, there is some (weak) evidence 
(Stoll [52]) that the presence of informed traders is 
positively related to the magnitude of the bid-ask spread. 
However, as Stoll [53] points out, while it has been 
possible to account for a good deal of the cross- 
sectional variation in bid-ask spreads, the variables 
employed in these studies often proxy for multiple 
effects. As a consequence, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about the relative importance of the various 
costs associated with the provision of dealer services.
The approaches discussed in the following section have 
attempted to address this issue from a somewhat different 
point of view.
II.B. Time Series Evidence
Researchers have long been aware of the dependence
between the bid-ask spread and observed price movements 
(see Niederhoffer and Osborne [42]).® However, Roll [47] 
was the first to recognize that this relation could be 
used to draw inferences about the bid-ask spread from 
the time series properties of transaction price changes.
Roll considers an informationally efficient market in 
which the probability distribution of observed price 
changes is stationary. By further assuming that the bid- 
ask spread is centered on the security's true value and 
that buy and sell orders are equally likely to appear 
in the market, Roll demonstrates that the covariance 
between successive price changes increases (in absolute 
value) with the magnitude of the spread. Alternatively, 
the spread faced by the average investor trading at 
observed prices can be estimated by a simple function of 
the covariance of observed price changes. Roll refers to 
this estimate as the effective bid-ask spread.
Roll's insight is important for two reasons. From a 
practical point of view, it suggests a simple method for 
estimating the bid-ask spread. Perhaps more important is 
the link forged between observed transaction prices and 
two sources of dealer costs.
If estimation of the spread is one's goal and it is 
believed that the underlying assumptions are a reasonable 
approximation of market conditions, the simplicity of
Roll's approach is attractive. On the other hand, Roll1 
model offers little opportunity for insight into the 
relative importance of various cost components of the 
bid-ask spread. In particular, assuming that the market 
is informationally efficient and that the distribution o 
price changes is stationary presupposes that information 
is symmetrically distributed in the market and that 
dealers do not employ the inventory management strategy 
suggested by Stoll [51]. To date three approaches have 
been used to examine the relation between transaction 
prices and the bid-ask spread under less restrictive 
assumptions.
Ho and Macris [28] and Glosten and Harris [22] 
construct regression models of the transaction return 
process which allow for the spread to shift either as a 
consequence of inventory management strategies or 
expectation revisions, respectively. Glosten and Harris 
make use of the analysis of Glosten and Milgrom [23] and 
Glosten [21] to model first differences in transaction 
prices as a function of a spread component associated 
with dealer order processing and inventory holding costs 
and one associated with the costs of adverse selection. 
Within the context of Roll's model, the first component 
reflects the tendency modelled by Roll for transaction 
prices to cross the spread. The second component allows
for nonstationarity in the distribution of transaction 
prices induced by revisions in the security’s expected 
true value.
Estimating the model using transaction prices for a 
sample of NYSE stocks, Glosten and Harris report evidence 
that both components of the spread are statistically 
significant and positive. While the adverse selection 
component is quite small relative to the order 
processing / holding cost, or gross profit, component for 
unit trades, Glosten and Harris assume that it is linear 
in trade size. Thus, the adverse selection component 
becomes relatively more important for large trades and 
may be an important economic consideration for the 
largest of trades.
Cross-sectional analyses of the estimates of the two 
components of the spread suggest that they generally 
behave as theory would predict. The gross profit 
component is positively related to the stock's return 
standard deviation and negatively related to the level of 
trading activity. While there is not a significant 
relation between the adverse selection component and the 
proportion of shares owned by insiders, it is positively 
related to the magnitude of the gross profit component 
and negatively related to the number of shareholders.
The first result is consistent with the interaction
between the two components demonstrated by Glosten [21].
Glosten and Harris contend that the second result
suggests that the specialist perceives the probability of 
any given trade being initiated by an informed trader as 
being smaller when ownership of the firm is diffuse.
Ho and Macris [28] estimate a similar model for a 
sample of thinly traded AMEX options. A detailed 
discussion of the relation between the two models is
provided in Chapter V. Ho and Macris' results are
generally consistent with those of Glosten and Harris.
In particular, the impact on transaction price changes of 
the gross profit component of the spread far outweighs 
that of shifts in the spread, in this case assumed to be 
related to the inventory management strategy described by 
Ho and Stoll [32].
In contrast to the regression models described above, 
both Choi, Salandro, and Shastri [10] and Stoll [54]
7suggest generalizations of Roll's covariance approach. 
Stoll [54] considers the impact of the spread on the 
covariance of successive bid and ask quote changes as 
well as that on the covariance of successive transaction 
price changes. Incorporating this additional piece of 
information allows Stoll to relate the quoted spread to 
three sources of dealer costs: order processing, holding 
inventory, and adverse selection. Stoll estimates the
model for a sample of NASDAQ stocks and concludes that 
43% of the quoted spread is associated with adverse 
selection costs. Thus Stoll's results suggest that only 
57% of the quoted spread is actually realized by NASDAQ 
dealers with 48% of the spread offsetting order 
processing costs while the remaining 9% reflects a risk 
premium for holding inventory.
Hasbrouck [27] takes a somewhat different approach in 
an attempt to detect the presence of inventory management 
strategies and dealer reponses to adverse selection. 
Hasbrouck recognizes that these two causes of shifts in 
the location of the spread have distinct implications 
both for the time series properties of price quotes and 
trade types.
If dealers use the inventory management strategy 
described by Ho and Stoll [32] effectively, there should 
be negative serial correlation in the series of buy and 
sell orders submitted to the market. In other words, an 
upward shift of the spread following a buy order is 
expected to elicit a sell order. On the other hand, 
adverse selection alone suggests that trades will be 
serially independent of one another.
Likewise, the two models of spread relocation have 
different implications for time series of price quotes.
As discussed earlier, quote revisions related to adverse
selection reflect revisions of expectations concerning 
the true value of the security and thus are permanent.
In contrast, quote revisions related to inventory 
management strategies are transitory in that they persist 
only until the desired inventory revision takes place.
Modelling trade and quote series for NYSE stocks as 
moving average processes, Hasbrouck finds evidence of a 
persistent impact of trades on quote revisions that is 
both strong and positive. While this is consistent with 
predictions of adverse selection models, the transitory 
effects suggested by inventory management models were not 
found to be significant. Furthermore, Hasbrouck finds 
little evidence of negative serial correlation in the 
trade series' of heavily traded stocks. However, the 
trade series' of thinly traded stocks do exhibit negative 
correlation, perhaps suggesting a relatively more 
important role for the specialist (relative to limit 
orders) in the provision of dealer services.
While the research in this area of the literature is 
at an early stage, as evidenced by the fact that much of 
the work discussed here is in progress, several tentative 
conclusions can be drawn. Studying the relation between 
transaction returns and the bid-ask spread appears to be 
a useful means of analyzing the relative importance of 
the various determinants of the spread. The evidence to
date suggests, not surprisingly, that the costs of 
processing orders are the primary determinant of the 
magnitude of the bid-ask spread. While adverse selection 
appears to have a statistically significant impact on the 
bid-ask spread, the evidence on its relative importance 
is mixed. Finally, the influence of inventory management 
strategies on the location of the bid-ask spread appears 
to be small and potentially an important element of 
dealer pricing only for thinly traded securities.
Ill. Conclusion
In concluding this Chapter it is useful to point out 
the contributions of the dissertation to the literature 
discussed in the preceeding sections. While Ho and Stoll 
[32] and Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb [11] have 
examined the influence of the interaction among competing 
dealers on the bid-ask spread, little attention has been 
given to the impact of such interaction on the adverse 
selection component of the spread. Chapter III makes a 
small contribution in this regard which takes on somewhat 
more importance in the context of the empirical analyses 
of the following chapters.
In contrast to studies focusing on the influence of 
competition between markets, Chapter IV employs Ho 
and Stoll's [32] insight into the problem of making a 
market for several securities simultaneously to take
a first step toward evaluating the extent to which 
barriers to interdealer trade across markets for related 
financial instruments influence the relative prices and 
transactions costs of these instruments.
Finally, Chapter V is an attempt to investigate 
empirically the link between the operational and 
informational efficiency of a market. A number of 
studies have documented the adjustment of prices to the 
release of information. The focus of this essay is on 
the mechanism by which this adjustment occurs. Following 
the analysis of Glosten and Milgrom [23], the dealer is 
viewed as an information processor whose perception of 
the degree of informational asymmetry in the market is 
reflected in the adverse selection component of his bid- 
ask spread. As such, this essay can be viewed as 
offering as an alternative to the usual event study 
methodology a potentially more precise model of the 
return generating process, founded on the theory of 
market microstructure.
Chapter III
Adverse Selection In a Heterogeneous 
Dealer Market
In a recent paper Glosten [21] explores the influence 
of the bid-ask spread on the statistical properties of 
transaction prices. Using a model based on the earlier 
work of Glosten and Milgrom [23], Glosten demonstrates 
that the portion of the spread associated with adverse 
selection has implications for transaction prices 
distinct from those associated with other sources of bid- 
ask spreads.
Glosten's analysis is limited in the sense that it 
applies to competitive dealer markets only so long as the 
the market is composed of a group of identical dealers.
In this essay Glosten's analysis of the adverse selection 
component of the market bid-ask spread is extended to a 
market of heterogeneous dealers.
Ordinarily, assuming dealer homogeneity would not be 
considered a serious limitation. Competitive pressure 
and the opportunity for interdealer trade tend to 
mitigate differences among dealers, thus, reducing their 
importance to a theory of market bid-ask spreads. On the 
other hand, Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb [11] 
make a rather strong argument concerning the importance 
of strategic behavior in the placement of limit orders as
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a determinant of the market bid-ask spread. Given the 
similarity between limit orders and the bid and ask 
quotes of a designated dealer, the argument is easily 
extended to a competitive dealer market.
However, the motivation for the analysis in this 
Chapter is somewhat more immediate. The assumption that 
the market bid-ask spread in a competitive dealer market 
tends toward the reservation spread of any single dealer 
is maintained throughout the empirical analyses of 
Chapters IV and V. The analysis in this Chapter will 
shed light on the consequences of violating this 
assumption.
Furthermore, the extant empirical analyses of the 
relative importance of adverse selection to the 
determination of bid-ask spreads are by no means 
conclusive. In particular, while Glosten and Harris [22] 
provide evidence of a statistically significant adverse 
selection component in spreads quoted by NYSE 
specialists, the only evidence from a competitive dealer 
market (Choi, Salandro, and Shastri's [10] analysis of 
the CBOE) suggests a complete absence of an informational
gcomponent in the market spread. It is also worth noting 
that while Glosten and Harris' estimates of the adverse 
selection component are statistically significant, they 
appear to be of economic significance for only the
largest of trades. If adverse selection is indeed a 
matter of second-order importance in the determination o 
bid-ask spreads, measurement and comparison of its 
relative importance under alternative market structures 
may be relatively heavily influenced by seemingly minor 
differences in the processes determining market prices i 
these markets.
Thus, the primary purpose of this Chapter is to 
provide additional insight into the empirical results 
reported in Chapters IV and V. In Section I the basic 
structure of Glosten's model of transaction prices is 
developed. The model is extended to markets with 
heterogeneous dealers in Section II. The primary 
conclusion of this section is that while the adverse 
selection component of the market bid-ask spread will 
tend toward that of any single dealer, differences among 
dealers can cause it to be smaller. Section III points 
out the potential problems associated with applying an 
empirical variant of Glosten's model to competitive 
dealer markets. The analysis suggests that even when 
adverse selection accounts for a significant portion of 
the market bid-ask spread, unmodelled differences among 
dealers will make detection of its influence more 
difficult.
I . The Model
Following Glosten [21], dealer bid and ask prices, B 
and A, are viewed as dealer expectations of the 
security's true price, p, adjusted for two factors. The 
first is an increment compensating the dealer for the 
costs of clearing orders, holding inventory, opportunity 
costs, and any monopoly power the dealer may have.
Glosten refers to this increment as the gross profit 
component of the bid-ask spread. The second factor 
influencing quoted prices is referred to as the adverse 
selection component of the spread. This increment to the 
dealer's expectation of the true price can be viewed
alternatively as either the dealer's compensation for
trading with individuals holding private information or, 
as will be seen later, the dealer's revised expectation 
of the true price conditional on the next trade occurring 
at the price he quotes. This approach suggests the 
following simple representation of a dealer's reservation 
ask and bid quotes:
A = p + Zj + Cj ,
(1)
B = p - ZB - CB ,
where Z and C represent the adverse selection and gross
profit components, respectively.
Following Glosten's notation, Zj and ZB can be 
written
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Zj = a(A) - p , 
ZB = p - b(B) ,
(2)
where the functions
*a(x) = E[p | H, 11 investor buys at x"],
*b(y) = E[p j H,11 investor sells at y" ],
(3)
represent revised expectations of the full information 
*true price, p , following a trade conditional on public 
information, H, and knowledge of the price at which the 
trade was executed. Given this notation, p can be 
wr itten
Glosten and Glosten and Milgrom [23] provide more 
rigorous analyses of functions like a(») and b(«) but for 
the purposes at hand Glosten finds it sufficient to place 
three restrictions on (3). First, by assuming that a(x) 
and b(x) are increasing in x, expectations will be 
subject to greater revision following a trade at an 
extreme price. Assuming a(0) = b(+») = p implies that a 
trader's willingness to buy at a price of zero or sell at 
an infinitely high price carries no information.
Finally, there must exist a(*) and b(*) such that the 
dealer can at least break even in his role as an 
intermediary between informed and uninformed traders.
This is essentially a statement about the demand 
elasticity of uniformed traders. It requires that the
p = E [p*|H] . (4)
uninformed, in order to meet their liquidity needs, be 
willing to bear the cost of trading with informed 
traders.
In the following section this model of bid and ask 
prices is used to examine a competitive heterogeneous 
dealer market. It is assumed throughout that all trade 
is conducted through designated dealers, however, the 
presence of uninformed traders submitting limit orders 
would provide similar motivation for the analysis.
II. Heterogeneous Dealers
In the following analysis it will be sufficient to 
differentiate dealers strictly on the basis of their 
current inventory positions. Ho and Stoll [32] argue 
that an extreme inventory position provides a competitive 
dealer with temporary monopoly power on one side of the 
market. When dealers differ only in their current 
inventory, the dealer with the largest inventory will 
provide the lowest (market) ask price while the highest 
(market) bid price will be offered by the dealer with the 
smallest inventory.
In the present model inventory differences among 
dealers are directly reflected in the gross profit 
component of bid and ask prices. However, Glosten [21] 
demonstrates that the adverse selection component is not 
independent of the gross profit component. Transactions
at low ask prices or high bid quotes carry less 
information and consequently lead to smaller revisions of 
expectations. Thus, inventory differences will be 
indirectly reflected in the adverse selection component 
as well.
Rewriting equation (1), the ask and bid quotes of 
dealer i are
A1 = p + ( a U 1) - p) + Cj
(5)
B1 = p - (p - M B 1) ) - Cg 
where i = 1,2,...,N and N >. 2. Similarly, market ask and 
bid prices are
AM = p + Hin{(a(A1) - p) + Cj}
H i i ( 6 )B = p - M i n U p  - b (B ) ) + Cj} .
Because dealers are assumed to differ only in their
current inventory position the market quotes are
provided by dealers j and k where
c j  =  M i n { c J }  =  c {
cjj =  M i n i c j }  =  cjj •
Since a single dealer will not dominate both sides of the 
market simply on the basis of his current inventory 
position, j ^ k. Thus, the market quotes are determined 
by the two dealers in the market with the most extreme 
inventory positions.^
H HThe market bid-ask spread is just A - B or
Because at*), b(»), and p are assumed to be the same for
each dealer, the assumption that dealers differ only in
their current inventory implies that Zj and Zj are the
minimum adverse selection components associated with
their respective side of the market. Furthermore, j ^ k
implies that the market spread and its adverse selection 
i kcomponent (Zj + Zj) are smaller than those resulting from 
the reservation quotes of any single dealer.
Several factors mitigate the differences in dealer 
quotes necessary to obtain this result. Ho and Stoll [32] 
argue that interdealer trade will limit differences in 
dealer inventory positions and thus differences in bid 
and ask quotes. That dealers may only draw their quotes 
from a discrete set of prices further limits differences 
in the prices they quote.
On the other hand, current inventory represents only 
one dimension on which dealers may differ. Differences 
on other dimensions such as capitalization, degree of 
risk aversion, and individual subjective expectations 
(equation (4)) may increase the probability of 
differences in the magnitude and location of reservation 
spreads quoted by different dealers. A final dimension 
on which dealers may differ, and which may be particularly 
relevant to understanding the adverse selection component 
of the spread, is the dealer's trading strategy.
Competing floor traders providing dealer services in 
the futures market and competitive market makers on the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) employ a wide 
variety of trading strategies which can be distinguished 
by the length of the period over which the trader expects 
to hold the security (see Silber [49] and Cox and 
Rubinstein [15]). At one extreme is the scalper who 
tries to earn the bid-ask spread through a rapid 
succession of offsetting trades. A somewhat longer term 
strategy holds as its goal closing the day with a neutral 
position. At the other end of the continuum is the 
trader who takes positions based on predictions about 
long-term price movements.
The nature of the adverse selection problem faced by 
the dealer is his perception of the probability of facing 
an undesirable price movement while maintaining a 
position in the security. Thus, it may be more accurate 
to characterize the adverse selection component of the 
dealer's pricing problem as being relative to a 
particular holding period. All else equal, scalpers face 
the lowest probability of an adverse price movement 
during their expected holding period and, thus, the 
smallest expected loss to informed traders on any given 
trade.
III. Estimating Components of the Bid-Ask Spread
Glosten's model also provides the basis for inferring 
adverse selection and gross profit components of the 
market spread from time series' of transaction prices.
To see this, assume that dealers are identical and write 
the kth transaction price as
Pk = Pk + zfcQk + CkQk , (7)
where Jlk is the expected true price just prior to trade 
k and Qk is 1 if the trade k is executed at the market 
ask price and -1 if it is executed at the bid price.
Under this interpretation Hk can be rewritten as
Mk = Mk-1 + zk-lQk-l + ek , (8)
where ek reflects revisions associated with public 
revelation of information between trades k-1 and k.
Taking first differences in transaction prices yields
p k “  p k-l =  ‘M k  +  Z k Q k  +  c k Q k  "  M k-1 ~  z k - l Q k - l  ~  c k - lQk-l
=  H k - 1  +  z k - l Q k - l  +  e k +  z k Q k  +  c k Q k
~ Mk-1 ~ zk-lQk-l - ck-lQk-l 
= ZkQk + CkQk - Ck_1QJt_1 + ek . (9)
Assuming Z and C are constant, the adverse selection 
and gross profit components of the market spread can be
inferred from a time series of transaction prices by
estimating
Pk - Pk-l = ZQk + c <Qk - Qk-1> + Ek • (10)
Equation (10) is the general form of the model
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employed by Glosten and Harris [22]. A similar model is 
employed in Chapter V to estimate changes in the relative 
importance of each component of the spread during periods 
associated with information arrival. The analyses are 
conducted with data generated under the competitive 
market making system of the CBOE. Unlike Glosten and 
Harris' conclusions concerning the composition of spreads 
quoted by NYSE specialists, the results reported later 
suggest that adverse selection is not a significant 
factor in the determination of market bid-ask spreads.
In a recent paper, Choi, Salandro, and Shastri [10] 
arrive at a similar conclusion in their analyses of bid- 
ask spreads for CBOE options. Since this evidence is 
also obtained using a variant of Glosten and Harris’ 
model, it is worth considering the implications of 
applying this model to a competitive dealer market.
The simplest way to address this issue is to assume 
that dealers have different information on which they 
condition their expectations of p.. Recalling equation 
(4), this can be expressed by
Mk = E[Ji* JH1] .
Considering a sequence of two transactions executed at 
prices set by two dealers, i and j, equation (9) can be 
rewritten as
pk ~ pk-l = Hk + z kQk + c kGk “ ^k-1 “ z k-lQk-l " c k-lQk-l
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=  Mk-1 +  Zi-iQt-1 +  £ k + ZkQk + CkQk
“  M k - l  “  z k- l Q k - l  “  c k - l Q k - l
=  z k Q k  +  c k Q k  "  c k - l Q k - l  +  < E k +  ^ k - l  "  M k - 1 >  • ( 1 ; L >
Admittedly, this is a somewhat contrived example.
However, it serves to make a potentially important point.
To the extent that differences among dealers exist and go
unmodelled, their influence enters the error term of the
regression model. Even if the error term is uncorrelated
with the regressors so that Z and C can be estimated
consistently, one would expect to observe larger standard
errors. Consequently, were adverse selection to play a
significant role in the determination of market bid-ask
spreads, its role would be more difficult to detect. If
this role is small to begin with, as might be inferred
from Glosten and Harris' results, relatively minor
differences among dealers may have a relatively large
impact on conclusions drawn from data generated by a
competitive market making system.
IV. Conclusion 
The purpose of this essay was to point out two 
consequences of dealer heterogeneity that have potential 
for influencing the empirical analyses in the following 
chapters. In Section II it was demonstrated that 
differences among dealers could lead the market bid-ask 
spread and both its gross profit and adverse selection
components to be smaller than those of any single dealer. 
The argument was based on Ho and Stoll's [32] 
characterization of the market bid-ask spread in a 
competitive dealer market and Glosten's [21] observation 
that the two components of the spread are not independent 
of one another. The key to the result was the assumption 
that interdealer trade is sufficiently inhibited so as to 
allow differences in individual dealer inventory 
holdings.
Prom Section III it can be concluded that if such 
differences exist and they go unmodelled, the empirical 
analyses conducted in Chapter V will be less likely to 
detect the influence of either component of the spread on 
transaction prices even when their influence is present. 
This may be a relatively more important problem when 
examining what previous studies have suggested to be the 
relatively small influence of the adverse selection 
component.
While the importance of differences among dealers is 
arguable, the preceeding analysis is potentially 
important in the present context. The empirical analyses 
that follow either explicitly or implicitly maintain the 
assumption that the market spread in a competitive dealer 
market will be that of any single dealer. In the absence 
of data on individual dealers it is impossible to assess
the soundness of this assumption. The discussion in this 
essay at least points out the potential consequences of 
naively maintaining this assumption.
Chapter IV
Cross-Security Effects and the Use of Options Markets 
to Study Bid-Ask Spreads
The discussion in Chapter II suggested that the 
market microstructure literature has advanced to the 
point where a good deal of the cross-sectional variation 
in bid-ask spreads can be accounted for. Furthermore, 
recent advances in our knowledge of the relationship 
between spreads and the time series properties of 
transaction prices suggest methods of apportioning bid- 
ask spreads among the various costs faced by the market 
maker in his role as a dealer. However, while on most 
exchanges dealers make market in several securities 
simultaneously, relatively little is known about the 
interaction between the dealer's pricing decisions for 
these securities. The purpose of this essay is to point 
out that these cross-security effects have relevance for 
the study of dealer pricing both because they open a new 
set of testable hypotheses about the cross-sectional 
variation in bid-ask spreads and because they suggest how 
existing time series methods for estimating bid-ask 
spreads can be more effectively applied in some cases.
The options market provides an opportunity for a highly 
controlled empirical demonstration of these issues.
It is well known that because an option can be
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viewed as a levered position in the underlying stock 
there exists an intimate relationship among the values of 
different options on the same stock. In Section I it is 
shown that combining a theory of spread determination 
with a theory of option pricing leads to a detailed set 
of testable implications about the relationship among the 
bid-ask spreads quoted for different options on the same 
stock. Applying this approach using the inventory 
control model of dealer pricing proposed by Ho and Stoll 
[32] and the Roll [48]/ Whaley [59] model for pricing 
American call options, it is found that data from the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange support the qualitative 
predictions, but not the precise functional form emerging 
from the model.
The fact that an option represents a levered 
position in the underlying stock implies that a trade in 
any option provides information relevant to all options 
on the same stock. Likewise, to the extent that dealers 
make market across options on the same stock (as they are 
obligated to do on the CBOE), a trade in any one option 
affects the overall (stock equivalent) inventory position 
relevant for determining price quotes on all options. 
Thus, whether dealers adjust quotes in response to the 
arrival of information through the trading process, 
changes in inventory positions, or both, all trades in an
option class are relevant to quote determination.
This result is particularly important when 
estimating bid-ask spreads using transaction price data 
from the options market. Studies by Ho and Macris [28], 
and Choi, Salandro, and Shastri [10], effectively 
disregard a substantial amount of relevant data by 
basing estimates of the bid-ask spread on the time series 
properties of a single option's transaction prices. This 
result is formally demonstrated in Section II in the 
context of Ho and Stoll's model. In addition, 
comparisons are made between estimates of the spread 
derived using only data from the single most heavily 
traded option and estimates for the same option derived 
using data from all options on the same underlying stock. 
The results suggest that the use of more complete data 
leads to substantially more accurate estimates of the 
quoted bid-ask spread.
Thus consideration of the cross-security effects 
implied by the option pricing relation leads to a new 
source of testable hypotheses about the cross-sectional 
variation in bid-ask spreads, and points the way toward 
more effective application of existing time series 
techniques to data from the options market.
I. Cross-sectional Implications
Stoll [54] has suggested that bid-ask spreads can be
thought of as containing three components: order 
processing costs, inventory costs, and information costs. 
Presumably each of these interacts differently with 
different leverage characteristics of various options on 
a common underlying stock. Given a careful model of 
these interactions, observed variation in bid-ask spreads 
across options on the same stock provides information 
about the composition of the spread.
The cost of processing orders includes both the 
fixed costs of capital, labor, and the dealer's time as 
well as the variable cost of clearing orders. While 
these are very real costs to the dealer, they have 
received little academic attention, perhaps because it is 
difficult to view them as endogenous to a theory of 
trade .
The adverse selection, or informational, component 
of the spread reflects revision in the dealer's 
subjective expectation of the true price conditional on
the willingness of (potentially better informed) market
/
participants to trade at quoted prices. Glosten and 
Milgrom [23] develop this idea and analyze its time 
series consequences for a stylized market in which only 
unit trades occur. Glosten and Harris [22] propose that 
the amount of revision following a trade is a function of 
the size of the trade, a point demonstrated rigorously by
Easley and O'Hara [17] for a stylized model in which only 
two trade sizes are possible.
While the general direction of this literature is 
clear - trade size conveys information - the literature 
does not yet contain a rigorous model that is empirically 
applicable for other than stylized markets. Absent such 
a model it is not possible to work out precisely the 
differential information contained in the various levered 
positions implied by trades in various options.
Given the state of the theoretical literature, order 
processing and informational cost models are left aside 
to focus on the cross-security implications of a model 
based upon the dealer's inventory management problem. Ho 
and Stoll [32] have proposed such a model for the case of 
a dealer making market in several securities. The 
remainder of this section is a description of how this 
model applies to the options market and a test of the 
empirical predictions of the model using data from the 
CBOE.
A. The Model
In applying the Ho and Stoll model to the options 
market, it is assumed that the option dealer makes a 
market on two individual call options on the same 
underlying stock. Throughout the essay the term "class
of options" is used to denote the set of options written 
on one particular stock. Members of a class are referred 
to as 'individual options' or simply 'options'. Thus a 
dealer making a market for an option class containing two 
individual options is considered. Following Ho and 
Stoll's equation (8 ), the competitive dealer's 
proportional reservation selling and buying fees for 
option 1 are written as,
a! = 1/2 criRfQiCi - 2 1 ^ ,  (la)
bi = 1/2 crjRK^q + 2Ij), (lb)
where
Cj = the "true" value of call option i
Ij = XjCi + 012X2C2
Xj = number of contracts of option i in current inventory 
Qj = number contracts for which reservation fees hold
012 =: ^ 12/^1 
jcrj = per period variance of return of option 1 
crj2 = per period covariance of return between 
options 1 and 2 
R = -U” (W ) / (l+r)U'(W) , a discounted coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion where dealer utility, U, 
is defined over terminal wealth.
Note that in writing this equation all of Ho and Stoll's 
assumptions are retained, in particular the assumption 
that the dealer has a one period decision horizon.
The dealer's reservation fees for option 1 are a
function of both his initial inventory of that option and
his initial inventory of other options in which he makes
a market measured in terms of equivalent units of risk in
option 1. Assuming that the dealer makes a market only
in the options on a single underlying stock, the
reservation fees for each option are linked to one
another through their relationship to the underlying
2 2 2stock. Noting that crj = ftjas where S represents the
underlying stock and = (S/Cj) (SCj/SS) is option 1's
price elasticity with respect to the underlying stock
price, it follows from adding (la) and (lb) that the
dealer's reservation bid-ask spread for option 1 is
2 2a) + b) = ors RQ^Ci . ( 2 )
The relation between the option's spread and the 
underlying stock becomes explicit when (2 ) is written in 
the form,
2al + bi = S5iftiQicrsR , (3)
where 5^ = 5Cj/6S represents option l's hedge ratio. 
Finally, if it is assumed that the dealer's quote is good 
for one contract, then Qi = 1 and (3) can be rewritten as
the spread per unit of risk in the underlying stock
2(aj + bj) / = ScrsR . (4)
Viewing the underlying stock as a call option whose 
price elasticity and hedge ratio equal 1 .0 , it is clear
that equation (4) is identical to Ho and Stoll's equation 
(13) which represents the reservation spread for the 
underlying stock under a one period horizon.*®
Interpretation of equations (2) - (4) is quite 
intuitive. Consistent with option pricing theory, they 
suggest that the options dealer prices options relative 
to the underlying stock. Equation (2) implies that the 
dealer's relative spread for an option will be 
proportional to the option's squared price elasticity, 
or, the option's sensitivity to underlying stock price 
movements. Alternatively, equation (4) can be viewed as 
making the intuitively appealing prediction that the 
absolute spread is proportional to the number of units of 
risk in the underlying stock embodied in a particular 
option.
Given a formula for calculating the required option 
characteristics, these cross-security predictions can be 
empirically tested. In particular, note that the right- 
hand side of equation (4) depends only on characteristics 
of the underlying stock and dealer risk aversion. By 
definition the underlying stock is the same for all 
options in a class. The institutional structure of the 
CBOE requires that the same individuals deal in all 
options in a class. Thus the right-hand side of (4) is 
the same for all options in a class. This prediction of
the model is tested in the following section.
B. Empirical Analysis
The empirical analyses were conducted with data 
drawn from the resorted format of the Berkeley Options 
Data Base. The data base provides a time ordered record 
of each bid-ask quote and transaction recorded in the 
CBOE's Market Data Report (M D R ). The analysis is 
confined to the call options in 1 0 option classes traded 
on the exchange on January 27, 1982. The 10 option 
classes were those with at least 2 call options for which 
at least 100 bid-ask quote records were reported. The 
number of calls for which quotes were available ranged 
from 9 to 17 per class while the number of quotes per 
call ranged from a minimum of 6 to a maximum of 378. It 
is assumed that the first quote for each option, being a 
response to the Order Book Official's call for opening 
bid and ask quotes, is generated by a process unlike that 
generating quotes throughout the remainder of the day. 
These quotes are excluded from the sample. The 10 option 
classes are identified in Table I. Additional 
descriptive statistics for a representative class of call 
options are provided in Table II.
Equation (4) is a statement about the quoted bid-ask 
spread of an individual dealer. However, trade on the
CBOE is conducted with a group of competitive market 
makers. As Cox and Rubinstein [15, pp. 81-87] point out, 
it is possible that a market bid-ask quote recorded in 
the MDR is composed of the reservation fees of two market 
makers. However, Ho and Stoll [32] suggest that 
interdealer trade will constrain individual differences 
among dealers, causing the market bid-ask spread to tend 
toward that of any individual dealer. Following this 
line of reasoning, the quotes in the present sample are 
taken to be those of a representative market maker. 
Recalling the discussion of the previous chapter, to the 
extent that differences among dealers actually exist, the 
market quotes used in the analyses to follow will only 
approximate individual market maker quotes. Accordingly, 
the results must be interpreted with some care.
As a first test of the model we calculate a
'standardized spread' which is predicted by the model to
be equal for all options in a given class. The
standardized spread, STDSPD, is defined as the left-hand
side of equation (4), or the absolute quoted spread
divided by 6st. Note from (2) that this is equivalent to
2the relative spread divided by St and multiplied by the 
stock price.
6 and St were calculated for each record using the 
most recent transaction price in the underlying stock as
an input to the Roll [48]/Whaley [59] valuation formula 
for American call options.** Thus, for each of the 10 
classes of call options N time series' of standardized 
bid-ask quotes are obtained where N is the number of 
calls in the class. To test for differences in the N 
mean standardized spreads the following equation was 
estimated for each class of options:
STDSPDjjt = ®n^nt * e nt /
where I„t = 1 when observation t is on option n and ent
12is a heteroscedastic error term. The ten test 
statistics for the F-test of the null hypothesis
H0: 0i = 02 = • • • = 
are reported in Table I. The test statistics suggest 
rejection of the null hypothesis at any conventional 
level of significance.
Given that standardized spreads appear to differ 
within option classes, it is natural to ask whether these 
differences are in any way systematic. Table II provides 
a preliminary insight into this issue by reporting the 
average standardized spreads for National Semiconductor 
call options along with selected characteristics of the 
individual options. Table II reveals the diversity in 
means that led to the results reported in Table I . At 
the same time, the results suggest that paired 
comparisons could be made for which the hypothesis of
13equal standardized spreads would not be rejected. The 
results for the option class reported in Table II are 
qualitatively the same as those observed for the 
remainder of the option classes in the sample, thus, 
suggesting the presence of systematic influences on the 
standardized spreads.
As implemented, the test above is a joint test of a 
simple version of Ho and Stoll's model and the 
Roll/Whaley option pricing formula used to calculate the 
required option characteristics. In an attempt to gain 
insight into why the data reject the combined model, 
possible misspecification errors in each of its 
components were investigated. This was done by 
considering the possibility that equation (4) should be 
augmented by additional variables assumed not to play a 
role in the initial specification of the model.
First consideration is given to two possible problems 
with the implementation of Ho and Stoll's model. In 
deriving equation (4) it was assumed that the dealer's 
quote is good only for one contract. This assumption 
accords with the CBOE market maker's obligation to trade 
only one contract at the prices he quotes. However, to 
the extent that not all trades are single contract 
transactions, the quotes requested by a broker bringing 
market orders to the floor may be implicitly good for
more than one contract. If this is the case and the 
typical order size varies across options, then the order 
size, Q, for which reservation fees are set does not drop 
out of equation (4) as assumed in the first set of tests.
It is also important to recall that equation (4) is 
based on a one period horizon. When the dealer’s horizon 
is extended, Ho and Stoll [32] show that the dealer's 
reservation fee is a negative function of the probability 
of a reverse transaction during the next trading 
interval. If this probability varies across options, 
then it, too, belongs in an empirical specification of 
the standardized spread equation.** These issues are 
addressed by estimating equation (4) augmented by 
measures of the average trade size and frequency of 
trading for each option. Specifically, cross-sectional 
data were used to estimate;
lnSPDnj = a + PilnS„i + P2lnas + P3lnQni + •3<lnTni + eni/
where the subscripts denote the nth call option in the
ith class and InSPD is the natural log of the average
standardized spread. S„j is the average price of stock i
2associated with the bid-ask quotes of option n. crs is 
the implied variance of stock i's returns described in 
footnote 10. Qnj is the average number of contracts 
traded in each transaction in option n during the day and 
Tnj is the number of bid-ask quotes for option n in class
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Since Q and T result from decisions made by the 
trading public, they should be treated as endogenous 
variables determined by the standardized spread and 
characteristics of the individual options. This suggests 
that equation (6 ) should be estimated using simultaneous 
equation methods with the option characteristics as 
instrumental variables. The instrumental variables 
included were the number of days to maturity and the 
absolute value of (0.5 - 5jn) as a measure of the degree 
to which an option is away-from-the-money. The parameter 
estimates for equation (6 ) obtained from three-stage 
least squares estimation of the system are reported in 
Table III.A. Average trade size appears to explain 
little of the cross-sectional variation in the 
standardized spread. This suggests that assuming Q=1 in 
the derivation of equation (4) did not influence the test 
results reported in Table I. On the other hand, the sign
on 04 is consistent with the argument that the
standardized spread is negatively related to the 
probability of the dealer making an offsetting 
transaction and, thus, consistent with the more general 
form of Ho and Stoll's model.
While these results are supportive of a general form
of Ho and Stoll's model, the parameter estimates
associated with the stock's price and return variance are 
somewhat disturbing. Ho and Stoll’s specification 
implies Pi = Pj = 1.0. While rejection of the hypothesis 
for the stock's return variance may be considered 
somewhat questionable (t = 1.89), the exponent on S in 
the original specification (equation (4)) appears to 
differ significantly from 1.0 (t = 6.81). On the other 
hand, the signs of these coefficients are both correct. 
Thus, while the precise functional form emerging from Ho 
and Stoll's model does not seem to accord with the data, 
the qualitative predictions of the model are supported.
A second potential source of bias in the initial 
tests of equation (4) is misspecification of the option 
pricing model used to calculate option price elasticities 
and hedge ratios. Blomeyer and Johnson [8 ] provide 
evidence of systematic mispricing relative to market 
prices using the Roll [48]/Whaley [59] valuation model. 
Comparison of the model prices reported in Table II to 
the average midpoint of the quoted spread suggests that 
this may be a problem in the present sample, particularly 
for deep-in- and deep-out-of-the money options. To 
investigate the possibility of mispricing bias the 
following equation was estimated;
lnSPD„i = a + BilnSj + 32lncrs + 03lnHni + 04lnDni + eni/ 
where H represents the absolute value of (0.5 - 5nj) and
D represents the number of days to expiration of option 
n. Ordinary least squares estimates of the parameters of 
(7) are reported in Table III.B. The results indicate 
that there is a high degree of positive correlation 
between the size of the standardized spread and the time 
to expiration and degree in- or out-of-the money of an 
option. The second result is consistent with the 
systematic underpricing relative to market prices 
observed by Blomeyer and Johnson [9]. Based on this 
evidence the possibility that option pricing biases 
played a role in the initial test results cannot be ruled 
out. Once again, the coefficient on S is positive but 
significantly less than 1.0 (t = 5.06) as is the 
coefficient on the stock's return variance {t = 2.15).^ 
Finally, it should be noted that these results are 
also consistent with an unmodelled informational 
component in the spread. Glosten and Milgrom [23] 
demonstrate that dealers will widen their reservation 
spread in an attempt to offset expected losses to those 
trading on private information. If, as Black [7] 
suggests, traders holding private information are more 
likely to take positions in highly levered options, one 
might expect to observe relatively large bid-ask spreads 
for out-of-the-money options. Thus the relatively large 
standardized spreads observed for out-of-the-money
options are also consistent with an unmodelled adverse
selection component in the quoted bid-ask spread. Given
the strong theoretical support for a quantity dependent
information effect, this explanation is quite appealing.
Precise empirical confirmation must await an estimable
17form of an information model.
Taken as a whole, these results illustrate the 
usefulness of the cross-security approach for the study 
of market microstructure. A well formulated model of 
spread determination, in combination with a model 
relating the characteristics of individual options 
generated a body of previously unexploited hypotheses 
concerning the relation between bid-ask spreads for 
related securities.
Applying this approach to the inventory based model 
proposed by Ho and Stoll yielded mixed results. On the 
one hand, the qualitative predictions of the model, for 
example, that total risk is positively correlated with 
the magnitude of bid-ask spreads, were confirmed. On the 
other hand, the data do not support the precise 
functional form predicted by the model; observed spreads, 
standardized for effects predicted by the model, still 
exhibit systematic variation. Further examination of 
these spreads suggested that this remaining variation is 
associated with some combination of 1 ) the probability of
a trade reversal (suggesting a multi-period model would 
be more appropriate), 2 ) an informational / adverse 
selection component of the spread, and 3) biases in 
option pricing models.
II. Options Markets and Time Series Estimation of 
Components of the Bid-Ask Spread 
A good deal of recent effort has been devoted to 
using time series properties of transaction prices to 
draw inferences about the various sources of dealer 
costs. Among these efforts several have been attempts 
to estimate bid-ask spreads in the options market (Ho and 
Macris [28] and Choi, Salandro and Shastri [10]).
However, the model developed in Section I implies that
the high correlation between the returns of options on
the same stock complicates estimation of bid-ask spreads 
from transaction prices in the options market in a way 
that has not previously been recognized. To demonstrate 
this we rewrite equations (la) and (lb) as
a! = 1/2 erg R (Q]Cj - 21^, (8 a)
hi = 1/2 fticrsR^Cj + 2 1 !), (8 b)
where
II = XjCj + XjC^flj/fll) . (9 )
To see that (9) is true note that = pcricrj where 
p is the correlation coefficient between the returns of 
the two options. But since the expected returns of all
options on the same underlying stock are instantaneously 
perfectly correlated,
a 12 = crlcr2 •
Or,
2<j\l = ftjcrgftjcrg = •
Thus,
2 2 2(B12 = fl|ft20rs/^lcrs = •
Recalling the transformation made to obtain equation
(3), the dealer!s reservation fees can be rewritten as;
2
a j  = 1/2 Scrs R{6] f t iQ i  -  + 5 25ijX2^2/ 5 1 ) } ,  ( 1 0 a )
bi = 1/2 So-gRiaiftjQj + 2(<31ft1X1 + d1ffi1X2<32/<5i) } . (10b)
The ratio, <52/̂ 1' defines the number of option 1
contracts required to reproduce the implicit stock
position in the dealer's inventory of option 2 .
Equations (10a) and (10b) suggest that the dealer sets
his reservation fees for an individual option with
respect to his current position in the underlying stock
and the effect that a transaction in the option will have
18on this implicit stock position. Thus, the dealer can 
be viewed as maintaining a single reservation pricing 
function based on the risk, in terms of the underlying 
stock, introduced by a particular transaction.
Ho and Macris [28] base their estimates of 
specialists' bid-ask spreads on AMEX options on a model 
that is similar except for the additional assumption that
each dealer makes a market on but one individual option. 
Since they estimate the model in first differences, this 
means that price changes due to changes in the dealer's 
effective inventory caused by transactions in other 
options in the class are treated as random noise rather 
than inventory effects.
A similar point arises in the context of models in 
which the dealer updates his reservation bid and ask 
quotes based on information about the security’s true 
value inferred from the security's order flow (see 
Glosten and Harris [22]). In the options market the 
relevant information is that concerning the underlying 
stock. Since transactions in any option on the stock 
carry such information, the options dealer will update 
his expectation of the true value of an individual option 
conditional on the order flow for the entire class of 
options. Thus, whether dealer quotes contain an 
inventory component, an information component, or both, 
trades in any option ought to lead to a quote revision 
for all options on the same stock.
To provide some insight as to how the estimated bid- 
ask spread for an option is affected by the exclusion of 
information from transactions in other options Table IV 
reports spread estimates for a near-the-money near 
maturity call option in each of the ten classes examined
in Section I. The first column of Table IV contains the 
average quoted spread for each of these options on 
January 27, 1982. Columns two and three contain two 
estimates of the bid-ask spread based on the time series 
properties of the option's transaction prices during the 
day. The first estimate is derived from estimating Ho 
and Macris' [16] equation (19):
Rj = a + YXjj + 0 X2i + HX3J + ej , (11)
where
Ri = In (Yj / Y j.j),
Yj = the ith transaction price,
x li = Di Di-1 r
Dj = 1 (-1 ) if the ith transaction is a dealer 
sell (buy), 
x 2i = Ii-1 " Ii = Di-iVj-i ,
Ij = the dealer's inventory prior to the ith trade,
Vj = number of options exchanged in the ith 
transaction,
X)i = tj - tj_i ,
19 20tj = time at which the ith transaction occurred. '
Ho and Macris' estimate of the average bid-ask spread is
Spread = 2y P
where P is the mean true price during the sample 
21period. The estimates reported in Table IV are based 
on the mean transaction price for each option.
The second set of estimates, reported in the third 
column of Table IV, are derived using the method 
suggested by Roll [47]. Roll shows that if observed price 
changes have a stationary distribution and the market is 
informationally efficient, the "effective" bid-ask spread 
can be estimated by
Spread = 2 v-COV
22where COV is the covariance of successive price changes.
Columns four and five provide estimates analogous to 
those in columns two and three except that now 
information from other options on the same stock has been 
incorporated in the estimation procedure. Empirically, 
the importance of incorporating this additional 
information stems from our inability to observe the 
continuous process by which an option's reservation 
pricing function is updated. Because the option dealer's 
pricing problem can be viewed relative to the underlying 
stock, trades in other options carry information about 
this process. Thus our goal is to generate a single 
"standardized" time series from which we will infer a 
bid-ask spread estimate which would obtain had all trades 
in options on a common underlying stock occurred in a 
single option.
The most obvious approach to constructing such a 
series follows from option pricing theory. Note that
equations (1 0 a) and (1 0 b) suggest that a transaction in 
option 2 provides an opportunity to infer the dealer's 
reservation price for a transaction in option 1 having 
the same impact on the dealer's implicit stock position. 
Taking the near-the-money, near maturity call option as 
option 1 equations (1 0 a) and (1 0 b) can be generalized to 
the case of the dealer making a market for all of the 
call and put options on the underlying stock.
Specifically, write the ith transaction price in terms of 
option 1 as
Y-  =  P  + 1/2 s l e r j R t D i f f l i f t j Q ! )  -  2 ( t f 1f t 1X 1 +  e Jsi  ) > /  ( 1 2 )
*where Sj is the stock price implied by the ith
transaction price and N is the number of options traded
on the underlying stock. Similarly, Vj can be written
V- = Vj(aj/Si) . (13)
Thus the implied stock prices and hedge ratios for the
various options provide a means of computing
"standardized” transaction price and volume time series'.
Unfortunately, the option pricing biases mentioned
in the previous section appear strong enough that direct
application of equations (12) and (13) introduces
23substantial noise into the data. An alternative means 
of standardization was used to avoid this problem. For 
each observation the standardized transaction price was 
defined to be the price with the same proportional
relationship to the most recent bid and ask quotes for
option 1 as the actual transaction price had to the
quotes for the option in which the transaction actually 
24 25occurred. 1 Results based on these standardized 
prices appear in columns four and five of Table IV.
The salient feature of Table IV is the consistent 
relationship between the average quoted spread and the 
two sets of estimated spreads. With one exception, the 
incorporation of information from other options, in the 
present sample an average of more than five times as many 
transaction records, provides an estimated spread for the 
option under consideration which is greater than that 
obtained using only that option's transaction data. 
Furthermore, these estimates are, with few exceptions, 
nearer the average quoted spread for the individual 
option under consideration. These conclusions are 
reinforced by the summary statistics reported in the 
final rows of Table IV. Using Ho and Macris’ estimate of 
the spread, the root mean squared error between the the 
average quoted spread and the estimated spread is $0.0562 
per option when using data for the individual option and 
$0.0305 per option when information from other options is 
incorporated.
Thus, if the goal is to estimate the average quoted 
spread for a particular option, the results reported in
Table IV suggest that utilizing information from trades 
in other options on the same stock reduces the root mean 
squared error. As might be expected, the more general 
model proposed by Ho and Macris outperforms Roll's 
estimator in this sense. However, note that Roll's 
simple estimator using information from all other options 
produces a lower root mean squared error than using the 
more complicated Ho and Macris model with information 
from a single option. In addition to their implications 
for spread estimation, the results reported in Table IV 
suggest that understanding cross-security pricing 
relationships is particularly important when studying 
dealer behavior in the options market.
III. Summary and Conclusions 
The primary goal of this essay was to extend our 
understanding of how the costs of transacting in related 
securities interact with one another. Given a theory of 
dealer pricing and a theory relating equilibrium values 
of the securities in which a particular dealer makes a 
market, it was possible to derive testable predictions 
about the cross-sectional variation in the dealer's bid- 
ask spread. The relatively advanced state of the option 
pricing literature makes the options market a useful 
setting for testing these predictions.
The analysis of Section I can be viewed as a joint 
test of the inventory management model of dealer pricing 
proposed by Ho and Stoll [32] and the Roll [48] / Whaley 
[59] model for pricing American call options. When 
confronted with data from the Chicago Board Option 
Exchange, these models perform well in the sense that the 
variables predicted to influence bid-ask spreads do so 
with the expected signs. However the stronger 
predictions of the models with respect to functional form 
of the relationship and constancy of standardized spreads 
across options are rejected by the data. There is 
evidence that the remaining variation in the standardized 
spreads is associated with weaknesses in the models on 
which the tests were based. In particular, a more 
general form of Ho and Stoll's model that allows for a 
multiple period decision horizon as well as the influence 
of adverse selection appears in order. In addition, 
there is evidence that option pricing bias may have 
influenced our results.
In addition to making possible cross-security tests 
of models of spread determination, theories relating 
dealer quotes across securities also imply that the 
information and inventory effects of trades in any one 
security ought to influence quoted bid-ask spreads on all 
related securities. We demonstrate that this influence
is reflected in bid-ask spreads inferred from the time 
series properties of transaction prices. Consistent with 
this view, the empirical results reported in Section II 
suggest that incorporating information on the trade 
history of other options in the same class can lead to 
substantially more accurate estimates of the quoted bid- 
ask spread for an individual option.
Finally, it should be noted that work on the 
interaction of transaction costs on related markets is at 
a very early stage. As demonstrated here, attention to 
this point can enhance our understanding of the basic 
determinants of transaction costs. This line of 
reasoning also offers the potential to generate and test 
models describing how transactions costs are endogenously 
determined across markets for related securities.
Chapter V
An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Information 
Arrival In the Options Market
While several notions of informational efficiency 
exist in the literature (see Latham [39]), all 
essentially describe a market in which prices aggregate 
information rapidly, if not instantaneously. A large 
body of evidence suggests that financial markets are 
indeed efficient in the sense that prices adjust to the 
release of new information. However, the intraday data 
required to examine the speed of price adjustment has 
only recently become widely available. Patell and 
Wolfson [46] document the intraday stock price movements 
in response to earnings and dividend announcements and 
conclude that the greatest price response occurs within 
minutes of the public announcement. Jennings and Starks 
[36] extend the work of Patell and Wolfson by observing 
that the stock prices of firms with exchange traded 
options adjust more rapidly to the release of earnings 
announcements than do the prices of stocks without listed 
options.
A natural progression in the study of market 
adjustments to information would be to examine the 
mechanism by which these observed intraday price 
adjustments occur. Since prices on financial markets
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depend on dealer bid-ask quotes, an analysis of this 
issue must begin with a study of how dealers respond to 
the arrival of information. In particular, do dealers 
behave differently during periods of information arrival? 
As a result, are transactions costs measurably higher 
during such periods? Do these periods of dealer response 
to information coincide with periods of price adjustment 
documented elsewhere? Recent developments in the market 
microstructure literature suggest means of examining the 
mechanism by which prices adjust to information as well 
as the attendant costs of such adjustment.
This essay makes a start toward addressing such 
questions by employing these recent developments to 
investigate dealer pricing behavior around the 
(predictable) arrival of new information. Specifically, 
we assume that an adjustment similar to that observed 
by Patell and Wolfson occurs in the options market and 
consider the behavior of bid-ask spreads for a sample of 
twenty option classes traded on the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange during a period containing an annual or 
quarterly earnings announcements.
Recent studies of dealer behavior indicate that bid- 
ask spreads are associated with at least three distinct 
costs faced by the dealer: order processing costs, 
inventory holding costs, and adverse selection costs.
The nature of these costs being quite different, they can 
be expected to respond differently during periods of 
information arrival. The expected response of the 
individual cost components is discussed in Section I.
Venkatesh and Chiang [58] use this line of reasoning 
in their examination of the influence of earnings and 
dividend announcements on closing bid-ask spreads for a 
sample of NYSE stocks. Their study provides some 
evidence of increases in both the holding cost component 
and an adverse selection / order processing cost 
component of the spread prior to a nonroutine 
announcement."
This study differs from their's in several respects . 
First, the impact of earnings announcements is examined 
within the context of the options market. Selection of 
the options market is suggested by the discussion in 
Chapter III which implied that information traders may 
find the options market an attractive alternative to the 
stock market. Furthermore, Black [7] observes that the 
high leverage characteristic of some options makes the 
options market particularly well suited to traders 
holding private information.
Manaster and Rendleman [40] provide evidence that 
option prices do indeed carry informat.^n about future 
stock prices. This notion is supported by Patell and
Wolfson's [44] [45] observation that implied volatilities 
tend to increase prior to the release of an earnings 
announcement and decrease as the uncertainty surrounding 
the announcement is resolved. Within this context 
Jennings and Starks' [36] results are consistent with the 
presence of traded options enhancing market adjustment to 
information. Thus, the extant evidence suggests that it 
is not unreasonable to view the options market as the 
site of the market's first reaction to new information.
More importantly, a relatively explicit model of the 
transaction price process in the options market is
employed to model intraday price movements around the
time of the earnings announcement. Following the 
analyses of Ho and Macris [28], Glosten and Harris [22], 
and Stoll [54], an attempt is made to decompose the bid- 
ask spread into portions associated with the three 
sources of dealer costs. In principle, this approach
permits tests for changes in the magnitude and
composition of the spread around the release of the 
announcement.
The results presented in Section IV suggest that the 
earnings announcements in the present sample had little 
influence on the pricing behavior observed in the options 
market. However, the generality of this conclusion is 
quite limited. The present sample is small and composed
of large and, presumably, closely monitored firms. 
Furthermore, no attempt is made to discriminate between 
unexpected announcements and announcements whose content 
was accurately forecast.
While these limitations suggest possible future 
research, the primary conclusion drawn from this study 
concerns the current state of our ability to estimate and 
decompose market bid-ask spreads. The results presented 
here and elsewhere suggest that much work remains in this 
area. Any further insight provided by future studies of 
this type will be contingent upon the ability to model 
more accurately the processes by which prices are 
determined in financial markets. Section V concludes the 
chapter with several general observations on this issue.
I. Information Arrival and the Components 
of Bid-Ask Spreads 
Studies of dealer behavior indicate that it is 
useful to think of bid-ask spreads as containing three 
distinct components. These correspond to the three major 
types of costs incurred by dealers: order processing 
costs, inventory holding costs, and adverse selection 
costs.
In addition to the cost of buying or leasing a seat 
on the exchange, market makers on the CBOE face the 
opportunity cost of their time and the commissions they
must pay a clearing member for each contract traded.
These commissions typically vary with contract price and 
the amount of business the market maker does with the 
clearing member. In return the clearing member covers 
the per contract fees paid to the Clearing Corporation 
and the Exchange as well as market maker overhead and any 
special services provided the market maker. Thus, 
overhead and clearing costs appear to be fixed per 
contract in the short run. On the other hand,the 
dealer's order processing cost per unit should be 
decreasing in average trade size as he is able to spread 
the cost of his seat and time over more units.
Holding costs refer to the cost of maintaining the 
inventory required to make a market in a security. Stoll 
[51] suggests that the bid-ask spread compensates the 
dealer for bearing diversifiable risk associated with the 
suboptimal positions his role in the market requires him 
to maintain.
Adverse selection costs, first suggested by Bagehot 
[5], occur because dealers face the prospect of trading 
with investors holding superior information. Under these 
circumstances Glosten and Milgrom [23] suggest that a 
dealer will provide quotes reflecting his expectation of 
the security's true price conditional on the next trade 
being executed at these quotes. In doing so the dealer
infers information from the flow of orders to the market.
The view taken here is of the dealer as the 
transmission mechanism through which market prices 
respond to new information. It is expected that the 
arrival of information will alter dealer pricing 
behavior, and therefore the bid-ask spread, in a 
predictable manner. Thus this study focuses on the 
response of these three components of the spread to the 
information generated through the release of earnings 
announcements.
The most direct link between the arrival of 
information and the corresponding price response is 
through the adverse selection component of the bid-ask 
spread. Independent of the actual content of an 
announcement, the certain prospect of an announcement of 
uncertain content should increase the dealer's estimate 
of the degree of informational asymmetry in the market.
In response, the adverse selection component of the 
spread should increase and remain larger until the 
informational asymmetry is resolved. If the announcement 
itself resolves the asymmetry associated with this 
particular piece of information, this increase should be 
observed before the announcement and ought to dissipate 
at the announcement or as the market digests the 
information.
On the other hand, to the extent that the timing and 
content of an earnings announcement is predictable, an 
informational asymmetry will not exist and no change in 
the adverse selection component should be observed. As 
Patell and Wolfson [46] point out, firms with listed 
options are likely to be closely monitored by analysts 
and therefore more likely to fall in this category.
The prospect of information arrival (as distinct 
from the content of the information) can also affect the 
holding cost component of the spread by temporarily 
increasing the risk of holding the security in the period 
immediately before the announcement. If this occurs, the 
holding cost component should increase during some period 
preceding the announcement and dissipate as the content 
of the announcement becomes known to the market. Patell 
and Wolfson [45] present evidence of such a pattern in 
the behavior of an option's implied volatility prior to 
the arrival of a quarterly earnings announcement.
Alternatively, the holding cost component may be 
permanently altered by the content of the announcement.
A change in the risk characteristics of a security 
affects the dealer's inventory problem and thus will be 
reflected in the holding cost component of the spread.
Any alteration should appear as the information is 
revealed to the market. This might occur through leakage
of information prior to the public announcement, at the 
time of the announcement, or even following the 
announcement if adjustment is not instantaneous. Thus 
the specific effect of an earnings announcement on the 
holding cost component of the spread depends on the 
content of the announcement and the manner in which the 
information is revealed to the market. The holding cost 
component should increase, decrease or remain unchanged 
as the announcement suggests the underlying risk 
increases, decreases or remains unchanged. The change, 
if any, may occur before, at, or even shortly after the 
announcement, depending on the extent to which the market 
has anticipated the content of the announcement. In any 
event the timing of the response ought roughly to 
coincide with the timing of any price adjustments.
Finally, to the extent that options are used to 
temporarily hedge positions in the underlying stock, the 
impending arrival of an earnings announcement may lead to 
an increase in hedging activity and thereby disrupt the 
normal flow of orders to the market. If this disruption 
increases (decreases) the average number of contracts 
involved in a trade, the order processing cost component 
of the (per contract) spread would be expected to 
decrease (increase).
In summary, to the extent that the impending release
of an earnings announcement increases the dealer's 
perception of the degree of informational asymmetry in 
the market, the adverse selection component of the bid- 
ask spread is expected to increase prior to the 
announcement. The holding cost component of the spread 
should be temporarily positively related to the degree of 
uncertainty prior to the announcement and permanently 
influenced by changes in the risk characteristics of the 
firm suggested by the content of the announcement. The 
only apparent source of influence on the dealer's cost of 
processing orders is the average trade size.
II. Estimation and Decomposition of the Bid-Ask Spread
Assume that a transaction price, pk, associated with
a unit trade can be represented by the general relation:
pk = Jik + CQk - B(Ik - I*) + ZQk, (1)
where Hk is the true price conditional on information
publicly available at the time of the kth trade, Qk takes
the value 1 (-1 ) when the kth transaction occurs at an ask
(bid) quote, Ik is the inventory prior to the kth
transaction of the dealer providing the price quote at
*which the trade is executed, and I is the dealer's 
desired inventory. Given this structure, C, B, and Z can 
be related to the three components of the quoted bid-ask 
spread discussed earlier. C reflects the dealer's order
costs and a "permanent" adjustment for the risk of 
holding inventory. Note that when the kth transaction is 
the result of a buy (sell) order these costs are 
reflected in a positive (negative) increment to the the 
dealer's expectation of the true price conditional on 
information available just prior to the trade.
Similarly, B represents a transitory adjustment
to the dealer's quote resulting from the dealer's effort
to achieve a desired inventory position. For example,
faced with the risk associated with an inventory surplus
*prior to the kth trade (Î  — I > 0 ) ,  the dealer adjusts 
prices downward in an effort to reduce the surplus on the 
next trade.
The dealer's revision of can be written as
Mk = + Z Q u  + £k , (2)
where ej; reflects the evolution of the true price between 
trades k and k-1. As such, Z represents the dealer's 
revision of p. conditional on the current trade. Thus, Z 
is the adverse selection component of the spread as 
described by Glosten and Milgrom [23].
Equation (1) contains as special cases the 
transaction price processes described by Ho and Macris 
[28] and Glosten and Harris [22]. In particular, Ho and 
Macris assume that Z = 0 while Glosten and Harris assume 
that B = 0.
Since all trades are assumed to be for one unit,
Ik = Ik-1 " Qk-1 • O )
Substituting (3) into (1), the first difference of 
equation (1 ) yields;
d k = Pk " Pk-1
= (C + Z)(Qk - Qjt-x) + (B + Z ) Qk_! + £k , (4)
which is the model estimated by Ho and Macris to obtain 
an estimate of the quoted bid-ask spread for a sample of 
AMEX options. Note that even if Z is not equal to zero 
as Ho and Macris assume, the model estimated in this form 
yields an estimate of the quoted bid-ask spread,
(2(C + Z)).
Equation (4) can also be written
dk = (C - B)(Qk - Qk_i) + (B + Z ) Qjj + £k , (5)
which is the form of the model estimated by Glosten and 
Harris. One of Glosten and Harris' goals was to 
decompose the quoted bid-ask spread into a component 
reflecting order processing and holding costs and an 
adverse selection component. From equation (5) it is 
clear that this is possible only when the dealer does not 
attempt to manage his inventory by shifting his quotes 
relative to the true price of the security (B = 0).
Since we have no a priori reason to assume either 
that dealers do not manage their inventory through the 
location of the spread (B = 0) or that they perceive no
informational asymmetry in the market (Z = 0), the model 
does not allow the spread decomposition necessary for an 
analysis of the price adjustment consequences of 
information arrival discussed in the previous section. A 
recent paper by Stoll [54] suggests that the additional 
piece of information required to achieve this 
decomposition is the probability of a reversing order, 
i.e., a buy order followed by a sell order or vice 
versa.
Stoll follows Roll [47] in pointing out that 
covariances of first differences in transaction prices 
carry information about the bid-ask spread. Stoll's 
contribution is to note that covariances of first 
differences in bid and ask quotes carry additional 
information about the spread. Stoll demonstrates that 
the two covariances are functions of two parameters: the 
probability of a reversal, tc, and the size of a price 
reversal as a proportion of the spread, <5. The adverse 
selection component can then be expressed as a proportion 
of the spread,
1  -  2  (it -  6 ) . ( 6 )
Again, following Stoll the holding cost component as a
proportion of the spread is
2 (ti - 0.5) . (7)
Note that when the dealer does not attempt to manage his
inventory through the placement of the spread or his 
inventory management strategy has no impact on the order 
flow, transactions should be independent of one another 
and u will be equal to 0.5. Consequently, (7) will be 
equal to zero. When <5 is also zero, (6 ) is zero and the 
entire spread will be related to the cost of processing 
orders .
Within the context of the general model presented 
earlier, Jameson [33] has shown that
<5 = (B + Z) / 2[(C - B) + (B + Z )]. (8 )
This suggests estimation of equation (5) to obtain an 
estimate of the quoted bid-ask spread, (C - B) + (B + Z), 
the order processing cost component, (C - B), and 5. 
Estimation of it then permits a complete decomposition of 
the estimate of the quoted spread. In addition to a 
discussion of the data and methodology used to test the 
hypotheses generated in the previous section, the 
following section provides a description of the procedure 
used to estimate it.
III. Data and Methodology
A. The Data
The data used in this study were drawn from the 
resorted format of the Berkeley Options Data Base. The 
data base contains a time stamped record of each 
transaction and each change in the quoted bid/ask spread
for all options traded on the CBOE. Twenty firms making 
earnings announcements during the January-February 1982 
period were chosen for inclusion in the sample. The only 
requirements for inclusion were that there be no dividend 
or other major announcement within four days of the 
earnings announcement and that there be at least 1 0 0  
transactions within the option class during the four day 
period beginning with the day of the announcement.
For each firm in the sample, a data set containing 
every option transaction during the sample period was 
constructed. Opening transactions, which could occur at 
a price set in the process of opening an option, were 
excluded as being unrepresentative of the continuous 
trading process occurring throughout the remainder of the 
d a y .
The discussion in Chapter IV concerning the nature of
the dealer's pricing problem in the options market
suggests that examining the transaction price process for
an entire class of options, rather than that of an
individual option, will provide more insight into the
response of market makers to the arrival of an earnings
announcement. Following the procedure employed there,
a near-maturity, near-the-money call option was chosen as
the 'base' option to which prices at which transactions
27executed in other options were standardized.
Once all transactions were converted to base option 
units, time series' of first differences in transaction 
prices were constructed for each of the 2 0 option classes 
with the time series starting anew each day so as not to 
include differences between closing and opening 
transaction prices.
The behavior of the bid-ask spread is examined during
three time periods associated with market adjustment to
the release of an earnings announcement: pre-adjustment,
post-adjustment, and a period during which the majority
of the market adjustment is assumed to occur. Defining
day 0 as the day of the announcement, days +2 and +3 are
maintained as a control period during which it is assumed
the market has completed its adjustment to the earnings
announcement. Patell and Wolfson [46] report that prices
of stocks with options traded on the CBOE exhibit the
majority of their response to an earnings announcement
during the first five to fifteen minutes following the
announcement with some evidence of an additional
adjustment occurring during the subsequent overnight
period. To allow for the possibility that information
arrives in the options market prior to the day of the
announcement, the market's adjustment period is defined
28to include days -2 and -1 as well as day 0. Finally, 
days - 1 2  and - 1 1  are assumed to be representative of the
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market prior to any response associated with the earnings 
announcement. Summary statistics for the data from each 
period are reported in Table V.
The analyses to follow are confined to this fairly 
narrow time span to minimize the influence of changes in 
the risk/return characteristics that occur naturally as 
an option's expiration date approaches. The pre­
adjustment period is included to permit an examination of 
the nature of any changes that may occur in the holding 
cost component of the spread. Specifically, a relatively 
large holding cost component during the adjustment 
period would be consistent with a transitory increase in 
risk similar to that observed by Patell and Wolfson [45] 
in an option's implied volatility. On the other hand, 
finding the holding cost component to be small (large) 
during the pre-adjustment period relative to the post­
adjustment and/or adjustment periods would be consistent 
with a permanent increase (decrease) in the option's risk 
perhaps associated with the content of the announcement.
B. The Econometric Model
The econometric model is derived from the general 
model developed in the previous section. Recalling 
equation (5)
dk = (C - B)(Qk - Qk-i) + (B + Z)Qk + Ek , (5)
£][ = 0 for all k when prices respond exclusively to 
information reflected in the history of trade. On the 
other hand, it is likely that information will be made 
publicly available between trades. In this case the 
transaction price for trade k will reflect not only the 
revision of expectations associated with trade k but also 
the additional information made publicly available 
between trades. Assuming the amount of information 
between trades k - 1  and k is a positive function of the 
time between trades, fl(t|j), equation (5) can be 
rewr itten;
dk = f 1 (tk) + (C - B)(Qk - Qk_i) + (B + Z)Qk + £k , (9)
where £. is now a heteroscedastic error vector with mean
2zero and variance a fj(tk) •
Easley and O'Hara [17] argue that the permanent price 
revision associated with adverse selection will be an 
increasing function of trade size. Following Glosten and 
Harris [22] and Ho and Macris [28], (B + Z) is assumed to 
be linear in the signed trade size, QV. Finally, to 
allow for differences in the spread components between 
the post-adjustment (control) period (days +2 and +3) and 
the pre-adjustment (days - 1 2  and -1 1 ) and adjustment 
periods (days - 2 , -1 , and 0 ), define an indicator 
variable, L, where
0 During the control period,
L = {
1 Otherwise.
Equation (9) can then be respecified as
dk = 0O + MQlt “ Qk-1> + P2Lk(Qk “ Qk-l)
+ PjQijVjt + P̂ LijQijVk + e k , (10)
where d and V are understood to represent the 
standardized price change and trade size as described in 
Chapter IV. Thus, for example, when L = 1 represents the 
adjustment period, the sum ^f=iBj represents an estimate 
of one half the quoted bid-ask spread during the 
adjustment period. Similarly, |3i is an estimate of one 
half the order processing cost component of the spread 
for the entire sample period while O3 represents one half 
of the adverse selection / holding cost component during 
the same period.
C. Estimation of Equation (10)
Assuming that fj(t) is constant and that Q. is
observable and independent of the parameters of
equation (1 0 ) can be estimated using ordinary least 
29 30squares. ' Transaction prices coincide with either 
the quoted bid or quoted ask price for 67% of the 
observations in the current sample. In such cases Q is 
assumed to be known with certainty. However, the 
remaining 33% of the transactions in the sample occur 
within the quoted spread. In these cases Q is observable 
only with error and consequently the OLS parameter
estimates will be biased.
It is possible to estimate the parameters of equation 
(1 0 ) consistently using maximum likelihood methods.
Harris [26] points out the difficulties that first 
differencing of the unobservable Qs creates in evaluating 
the likelihood function, and suggests a recursive 
technique for overcoming this problem. Glosten and 
Harris [22] employ Harris' recursive technique within a 
gradient optimization procedure. Rather than following 
this approach, it is noted that this problem is similar 
to that of estimation in a switching regressions context. 
Kiefer [37] points out that maximum likelihood estimates 
in that context can be thought of as weighted least 
squares estimates in which the weights are a function of 
the estimated parameters.
The problem can be illustrated intuitively by noting 
that £jt is associated with one of four possible states: 
State 1 : Q); = 1 , Qjj_i = 1
State 2 : Q]j = -1 , Qj-i = -1
State 3 : Qj = 1 , Qjj.j = -1
State 4 : Q); = -1 , Qjj-i = 1 .
The estimation problem is then one of assigning the 
appropriate weight to each of the four states.
Kiefer proposes that maximum likelihood estimates be 
calculated by computing first round weighted least
squares parameter estimates assuming constant weights 
and then iteratively recomputing the weights conditional 
on the data and the previous round's parameter estimates
Although the appropriate formula for computing the 
weights in the present problem differs from the simple 
switching regression problem, the iterative procedure 
can be used to compute maximum likelihood estimates in 
the present context. Harris' recursive technique is 
required at each iteration to compute the relevant 
weights and at the final iteration to obtain the Hessian 
of the maximized likelihood function. A complete 
description of the estimation procedure is provided 
in Jameson and Wilhelm [35].
The advantage of this approach is that, unlike 
gradient methods, it does not require evaluation of the 
derivatives of the likelihood function at each iteration 
This is particularly desirable in the present case since 
evaluation of the derivatives involves the same 
complications faced when evaluating the likelihood 
function.
Furthermore, the maximum likelihood procedure 
incorporates a considerable amount of sample information 
in the calculation of the initial weights. Knowledge of 
current bid and ask quotes allows calculation of a 
probability that a particular transaction is the result
of a buy order (Q = 1). Specifically, it is assumed that 
Pr(Buy) = (p - B) / (A - B) , (11)
where B and A represent bid and ask prices. Initial
weights are then defined to be the product of the
relevant current and lagged probabilities. Defining the
initial weights in this manner makes use of the 
knowledge that Pr(Buy) is equal to 1.0 or 0.0 for 67% of 
the sample.
A useful by-product of the estimation procedure is 
the matrix of final round weights associated with the 
maximum likelihood estimates. Individually, these 
weights represent the probability, conditional on the 
observed data, of an observed price change being the 
result of one of the four possible trade sequences. In 
other words, for each observation k, summing the weights 
associated with states 3 and 4 above yields the ex post 
probability, n^, that trade k was a reversing order. 
Recalling equations (6) and (7), tc is the additional 
piece of information necessary for a complete 
decomposition of the bid-ask spread.
IV. Empirical Results 
The results from estimating equation (10) are 
reported in Tables VI and VII. For each firm, three sets 
of parameter estimates are reported. The first set is
the maximum likelihood estimates. Also reported are the
weighted least squares estimates used in the first
iteration of the maximum likelihood procedure and
31ordinary least squares estimates. For the moment 
attention will be confined to the maximum likelihood 
estimates in Table VI which focus on the adjustment 
period (days -2 , - 1 , and 0 ) and the control period (days 
+ 2  and +3).
Recalling that 20j represents an estimate of the 
order cost component of the market bid-ask spread for the 
entire sample period, the order cost component of the 
spread is positive and statistically significant for each 
of the twenty firms in the sample. If the model is 
correctly specified, (32 and |3j should capture any 
alteration in dealer pricing behavior near the release of 
the earnings announcement. The estimates of 02 suggest a 
change in the order cost component during the adjustment 
period for six of the firms in the sample. The changes in 
02 are divided evenly between increases and decreases.
On the other hand there is little evidence of any 
alteration in the adverse selection / holding cost 
component. In only two cases (BNI, H R K ) might 04 be 
concluded to differ from zero. Perhaps more surprising 
is the apparent absence of this component of the spread 
over the entire sample period. Of the three cases in
which (B3 might be concluded to differ from zero (BMY,
BNI, GE), in each case P3 is negative. In light of this 
result, further decomposition of the spread as described 
in the previous section would have little meaning.
This result is particularly disturbing given the 
interpretation of 33 as the sum of the holding cost and 
adverse selection cost components of the spread. While 
this sum may be zero, there is no economic argument for 
negative values of 3 3 . Furthermore, in the context of 
Stoll's [54] model this would imply that dealer order 
costs are responsible for more than 1 0 0 % of the market 
bid-ask spread.
The pre-adjustment period (days -12 and -11) results 
in Table VII are qualitatively quite similar to those 
reported for the adjustment period except for the 
preponderance of increases in the order cost component of 
the market spread. 32 is positive for 16 of the 2 0  firms 
in the sample. One explanation for this result is that 
option prices are increasing in time to expiration and 
are subject to large fluctuations associated with their 
high degree of implicit leverage. Table VIII sheds some 
light on this possibility. In particular, note that the 
average relative spread does not appear to be 
systematically larger on days - 1 2  and - 1 1  as might be 
concluded from Table VIII. Thus, it appears that changes
in the order cost component of the spread are more likely 
to be systematically related to the average price level 
during the period in question rather than to the release 
of an earnings announcement.
Furthermore, the relative spread appears to be 
heavily influenced by the fact that dealer quotes come 
from a discrete set of prices. For example, the largest 
relative spread, 42% for BA on days +2 and +3, is 
associated with an absolute spread of only $0.08, or 
$0.0175 above the minimum spread implied by the l/16th 
increments in which prices are quoted for options priced 
less than $3.00. Thus, it appears that quoting prices in 
l/16ths does not offset the impact of price discreteness 
on low priced options. This suggests that modelling the 
effects of price discreteness may be an important 
consideration for any attempt to extend the present 
analys is.
Simply taking the results above at face value, there 
appears to be little evidence that the release of an 
earnings announcement influenced the pricing behavior of 
market makers in the firm's options. In addition to the 
regression estimates reported in Tables VI and VII, the 
summary statistics in Table V suggest that the 
release of the earnings announcement had little influence 
on other relevant measures of market behavior. In
particular, there is little difference across the three 
time periods in the time between trades, which should 
influence the cost of holding inventory, and average 
trade size, which is assumed to be positively correlated 
with the likelihood of the dealer trading with an 
informed investor. Upon exclusion of a single outlier 
(BA) from the control sample, the large average trade 
size on days +2 and +3 falls to 15.79 contracts.
Leaving aside questions about the consequences of 
earnings announcements, the results presented here raise 
serious questions about the specification of the model 
used to estimate the components of the market bid-ask 
spread. Since the value of further research of this type 
will be contingent upon the ability to model accurately 
the process by which market prices are set, possible 
misspecifications of the model used here are worthy of 
further consideration. To do so it is useful to ask what 
one would expect to observe were the model correctly 
speci fied.
First, the model implies that the average quoted 
spread during the sample period can be estimated by 2 (f3j 
+ 03V) . Comparing the estimates of |3j to the average 
quoted spread in the final column of Tables VI and VII 
reveals that 2 0 j appears in many cases to provide 
reasonable estimates of the average quoted spread during
the sample period. This would be expected if, in fact, 
adverse selection and inventory holding costs had little 
or no influence on market prices.
However, it is worth noting that there are 
considerable differences in the estimated spreads 
obtained under the three estimation procedures. Table IX 
reports several summary statistics to facilitate 
comparison of the spread estimates. For the sample 
including days - 2 , -1 , and 0 the root mean squared error 
between the average quoted spread and the maximum 
likelihood estimate of 20j is $0.06 or about 39% of the 
average quoted spread. Similarly the root mean squared 
error for the weighted least squares estimates is $0.08 
or 50% of the average quoted spread. In each case the 
mean squared error is heavily influenced by the poor 
estimates obtained for M R K . Excluding these, the root 
mean squared error is 30% and 39% of the average quoted 
spread for the maximum likelihood and weighted least 
squares estimates, respectively. On the other hand, 
the ordinary least squares root mean squared error is 
only 15% of the average quoted spread ($0.02). Similar 
results were obtained for the sample containing days - 1 2  
and - 1 1 .
It is not immediately clear why the ordinary least 
squares estimates consistently deviate less from average
quoted spreads than those obtained using either weighted 
least squares or the maximum likelihood method. However, 
it is worth pointing out that the only substantive 
difference in the three methods involves the 
classification of the Q s . To see what influence this may 
have on the observed results recall that the ordinary 
least squares estimates are based on the Qs being 
assigned the value E(Q) where for a particular trade
E (Q ) = 2Pr(Buy) - 1 , (12)
and Pr(Buy) is defined in equation (11). For the 67% of 
the transactions that occur at either the current bid or 
ask, equation (12) will correctly classify Q as either 1 
or - 1 .
The weighted least squares approach assigns an 
unconditional weight, Wj, i = 1,..,4, to each of the four 
states defined in Section III. Specifically,
Qk = 1 / Qk-1 = 1
with probability wj = Pr(Buyjj) • Pr ( B u y ^ ) ,
Qk = _ 1  / Qk-1 = - 1
with probability wj = [1 - Pr(Buy];)] • [1 - Pr (Buy^-i) ],
Qk = 1 / Qk-1 = - 1
with probability wj = Pr(Buy);) * [1 - Pr (Buyjj.j) ], 
and
Qk = _ 1  / Qk-1 = 1
with probability wj = [1 - PrfBuy^)] • Pr(Buy|j_i) .
Once again, when Pr(*) is one or zero for both trades k 
and k-1, the Qs will be correctly specified for price 
change k .
On the other hand, while the maximum likelihood 
procedure begins with the unconditional weights, the 
weights associated with the maximum likelihood estimates 
are conditional on the data and therefore will likely 
differ from w. As a consequence, it is not necessarily 
true that the value of Q inferred from the data will be 
identical to the observed value of Q for the 67% of the 
observations where Q is observed without error. While 
this suggests a loss of information, it appears unlikely 
to be a serious problem given the similarities between 
the maximum likelihood and weighted least squares 
estimates.
A second issue to be addressed is the nature of the 
adverse selection / holding cost parameter. As noted 
earlier, the occasional significant negative values 
observed for 83 are not consistent with any apparent 
economic argument. Ignoring these for the moment, it is 
still somewhat surprising, given the results reported by 
Ho and Macris [28] and Glosten and Harris [22], that 
there is no evidence of these costs playing a role in the 
determination of market bid-ask spreads. Several 
potential sources of bias deserve consideration.
Once again, estimates of 33 will depend heavily on the 
classification of the Q s . The model also assumes that 
this component of the spread is linear in trade size. 
Aside from possible misspecification of the functional 
relationship, it is known that trade size is measured 
with error for those transactions that do not occur in 
the base option. In an effort to examine the influence 
of this source of error the model was estimated under the 
assumption that the adverse selection / holding cost 
parameter is not a function of trade size. In addition 
to not altering the conclusions drawn previously, 33 and 
3|, after being scaled down by the average trade size, 
were of the same magnitude and typically quite similar to 
estimates obtained under the assumption that 33 and 3$ 
are linear in trade size.
Further insight into this component of the model can 
be gained by considering the model's predictions for an 
informationally efficient market in which the market bid- 
ask spread is stationary both in its magnitude and 
location. Under such conditions we would expect to 
observe 3fl = 33 = 0. While not reported in Tables VI and 
VII, 3q does not differ significantly from zero in the 
current sample.
Under the stationarity assumption it also seems 
reasonable to expect that buy (sell) orders will be
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equally likely to be followed by another buy (sell) order 
as by a sell (buy) order (see Roll (47]). In other 
words, given that 3o = 03 = 0 for most of the firms in 
the sample, we should not find the probability of 
reversal, u, implicit in the final round weights produced 
by the maximum likelihood procedure differing 
significantly from 0.5. Examination of these 
probabilities reveals considerable deviation, both 
positive and negative, from 0.5. The positive deviations 
are of particular interest. Following Stoll's [54] 
analysis a probability of reversal greater.than 0.5 
implies at least the existence of a holding cost 
component in the spread. This alone would be 
inconsistent with 0 j = 0 if it is assumed that the 
adverse selection component of the spread is nonnegative.
In their analysis of bid-ask spreads on CBOE options,
Choi, Salandro, and Shastri [10] arrive at a similarly
perplexing conclusion. The basis for their study is the
observed tendency of trades to arrive in bunches on one
side of the market. Consistent with this observation,
Choi, Salandro, and Shastri report evidence that is
strongly supportive of the notion of positive serial
correlation in time series' of trade types for individual
options, or alternatively, a probability of reversal less 
32than 0.5. They also estimate a model similar to equation
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(1 0 ) and find their analog to P3 not significantly 
different from zero. While these results are no doubt 
influenced by inattention to activity in other options on 
the same stock, they are noteworthy in that they suggest 
a negative holding cost component in the market bid-ask 
spread (see equation (7)).
At this point it is necessary to temper any 
conclusions drawn from observation of either the 
probability of reversal implicit in the maximum 
likelihood weights or the probabilities calculated by 
Choi, Salandro, and Shastri. As a practical matter, the 
CBOE's reporting system may make it difficult to 
distinguish between a single order split between several 
market makers and several orders on the same side of the 
market. In particular, during very active periods a sell 
order split among several dealers is likely to be 
recorded as several distinct sell orders separated by 
other orders arriving in the market at approximately the 
same time.
Furthermore, the maximum likelihood procedure 
employed in this study suffers from computational 
difficulties associated with the recursive evaluation of 
the likelihood function which appear to cause errors in 
the estimation of the weights used to calculate the 
probability of reversal. Specifically, there are
occasions on which exceeds 1.0. Since the weights
associated with the four possible states at each
observation should be nonnegative and sum to 1 .0 , this
suggests error in the computation of the weights. This
may not be surprising given that it is not uncommon for
the procedure to perform calculations on variables of the 
+50order of 10- or larger (smaller) . In fact, for many of. 
the firms it was not possible to achieve one iteration in 
the maximum likelihood procedure without first 
standardizing the variables involved in recursions. 
However, given the similarities between both the 
parameter estimates and covariance matrices of the 
maximum likelihood and weighted least squares estimates, 
it is not clear that this is a serious problem.
V. Conclusion
By examining the influence of the release of earnings 
announcements on CBOE market makers, this study stands as 
the first attempt to examine empirically the precise 
mechanism by which prices adjust to new information. At 
this point the empirical evidence is perhaps more 
indicative of the difficulties associated with inferring 
components of the bid-ask spread from transaction prices 
than of any systematic influences of information arrival 
on the bid-ask spread. Thus, while the study cannot be 
judged completely successful in this regard, it suggests
several avenues for further research. Foremost among 
these is the need for a better understanding of the 
relation between transaction prices and the determinants 
of market bid and ask prices.
With regard to the influence of earnings 
announcements on the pricing behavior of market makers in 
the options market, it appears safe to tentatively 
conclude that the earnings announcements in the present 
sample had little influence on the bid-ask spread or on 
other measures of market conditions such as the rate of 
order arrival and the average trade size. However, the 
generality of this conclusion is limited given the small 
sample examined here.
Several possibilities for extending both the 
generality and the quality of the analysis in the future 
are suggested by the present study. Most obvious among 
these is to expand the cross-section of earnings 
announcements under consideration. The present sample 
was restricted primarily in response to the extreme cost 
of employing the maximum likelihood estimation procedure. 
However, the results reported in Tables VI and VII 
suggest that there is little quantitative difference 
between the estimates obtained using the much less costly 
weighted least squares procedure and the maximum 
likelihood estimates. Furthermore, one would arrive at
qualitatively identical conclusions with regard to the 
relative importance of the components of the spread and 
changes in these components from either of these sets of 
estimates or even the ordinary least squares estimates. 
This would suggest that more information is lost by 
restricting the sample size than is gained by employing a 
more complicated estimation procedure.
In addition to offering the potential for more 
general conclusions, a larger sample would also offer the 
opportunity to discriminate between the impact of 
unexpected announcements and those whose content was 
accurately forecast. Given the discussion in Section II, 
we should expect to find the impact on dealer pricing 
behavior of an unexpected announcement to be greater and 
more highly concentrated around the release of the 
announcement and, thus, more likely to be detected using 
the methodology employed here.
On a more technical note, the potential for 
relatively large price movements during the sample period 
suggests that the empirical model be specified with 
respect to transaction returns rather than price 
differences. The influence of price discreteness also 
appears to be relatively large in the present sample. 
While modelling this influence would appear to be 
important, it adds a degree of complication to the
estimation procedure comparable to that introduced by the 
maximum likelihood method employed here to infer the 
trade type.
However, it appears unlikely that additional insight 
will be gained by implementing these suggestions without 
first developing a better understanding of the process 
generating transaction prices on the CBOE. This issue is 
discussed at some length in the next chapter.
Chapter VI 
Conclus i on
At the outset two goals were proposed for this study. 
The first was to gain additional insight into the link 
between the operational and informational efficiency of 
financial markets. The second goal was to examine the 
relation between transactions costs structures in markets 
for related securities. The extent to which these goals 
were achieved is mixed. With regard to the link between 
operational and informational efficiency, much work 
remains before the empirical methodology proposed in 
Chapter V sheds any additional light on this important 
feature of financial markets. On the other hand, much 
insight was gained from the analyses of Chapter IV. 
Furthermore, the analytical framework employed there 
appears amenable to the analysis of cross-market as well 
as cross-security relationships among bid-ask spreads.
As a conclusion to this study, Section I of this 
Chapter provides a brief summary of the conclusions drawn 
from the essays presented in Chapters III-V and their 
relation to the goals of the dissertation. The 
discussion in Section II centers on several issues raised 
in the dissertation that call for further research.
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I. Summary of the Conclusions of Chapters III-V
The first essay was included to point out that 
differences among dealers in a competitive dealer market 
may lead us to draw conclusions about the magnitude and 
composition of the market bid-ask spread that differ from
those that would be drawn were there a single dealer or a
group of homogeneous dealers. While this point is not 
directly related to the goals of the dissertation, it 
lends further insight into the competitive market making 
system examined in the second and third essays and in 
particular to the nature of the adverse selection 
component of the market bid-ask spread.
Chapter IV focused on the relation between 
transactions costs in markets for related securities. In 
doing so, two major points were made, each of which
suggests that intermarket links are important to the
determination of transactions costs for individual 
securities. First, a model was developed in which one 
component of the total cost of trading a security, the 
bid-ask spread, was shown to be related to the 
transactions costs associated with substitutes for that 
security. The empirical analyses, which in the present 
case were confined to the relation between the bid-ask 
spreads for options on a common underlying stock, were 
generally supportive of the model's predictions.
The second point made in Chapter IV involves the 
implications of the bid-ask spread being determined 
across securities for attempts to infer the bid-ask 
spread from a time series of transactions prices.
Because their expected returns are highly correlated with 
one another, the implied interaction between transaction 
prices for different securities is likely to be 
particularly pronounced for options written on the same 
underlying stock. It is demonstrated that modelling this 
interaction can lead to substantially improved estimates 
of bid-ask spreads for individual options. This insight 
is incorporated in the empirical analyses of Chapter V.
Perhaps the most disappointing feature of the present 
study is the results, or lack thereof, obtained in 
Chapter V. The goal of Chapter V was to provide 
empirical content to the notion that there exists an 
important link between the operational and informational 
efficiency of financial markets. Unfortunately, little 
new insight into the nature of this link was gained. 
Leaving aside the issue of whether earnings announcements 
influence dealer pricing behavior, the apparent 
nonpositive adverse selection / holding cost component of 
the estimated spread does not speak well for the 
analytical framework employed in the analyses. At this 
point, resolving this issue must take precedence over any
further attempts to empirically examine the relation 
between operational and informational efficiency within 
the present framework.
II. Directions for Future Research
The primary conclusion of Chapter III is that 
differences among dealers in a competitive dealer market 
may influence the magnitude and composition of the market 
bid-ask spread. The relative importance of such 
differences for understanding the nature of the market 
bid-ask spread is certainly arguable. The conclusion one 
draws from Ho and Stoll's [32] analysis is that 
interdealer trade mitigates differences among dealers, 
thereby reducing them to a matter of second order 
importance. On the other hand, differences among 
individuals submitting limit orders are the sole basis 
for the market bid-ask spread in the model proposed by 
Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb [11].
Unfortunately, the issue does not lend itself to 
empirical analysis. In particular, the discussion in 
Section III of Chapter III suggests that transactions 
involving different dealers be modelled as such. This is 
not possible given the data employed in this study. The 
CBOE does retain a record of the market maker(s) involved 
in each trade. However, the exchange requires that this 
information be filtered from the data used in this study.
Unfortunately, this method for maintaining dealer privacy 
is generally employed in all publicly available data of 
this type.
A similar problem arises when attempting to 
distinguish between orders executed by a dealer for his 
own account and those matched with orders on the limit 
order book. Even if this data were available, the 
literature does not contain an empirical model which 
explicitly allows for the influence of limit orders.
Thus, further insight into the importance of individual 
differences among the agents determining the market bid- 
ask spread awaits both more complete data and more 
explicit models of the interaction among competing 
bidders.
Perhaps more promising are several implications of 
the analyses of Chapter IV. The empirical analyses 
presented there were confined to the relation among 
bid-ask spreads for options on the same underlying stock. 
A logical extension of this analysis involves the 
relation between the bid-ask spreads for options and 
their underlying stock. The discussion in footnote 10 
points out that the model predicts a similar relation 
between the standardized spreads of options on a common 
underlying stock and the underlying stock's spread.
Given quote data for stocks with CBOE traded options,
this hypothesis is testable.
A somewhat more subtle implication of the cross­
security effects examined in Chapter IV is the existence 
of an endogenously determined total transactions cost 
structure across markets for related financial 
instruments. This point becomes clear in the context of 
the relation between the stock and options markets. In 
the absence of transactions costs options are redundant 
securities. While this point is widely recognized, it 
has a little recognized implication: the simultaneous 
existence of the stock and options markets implies an 
equilibrium transactions cost structure encompassing the 
bond market as well as the stock and options markets. 
Little formal attention has been given to the 
implications of transactions costs for the variety of 
contractual arrangements observed in the options market.
The fact that options are derivative assets suggests 
that the options market provides an additional source of 
liquidity for investors seeking to trade in the 
fundamental asset. In addition to providing additional 
competition in the provision of dealer services, the 
introduction of options markets increases the amount of 
capital devoted to market making. This would suggest 
that to the extent that the stock and options markets are 
well integrated, the introduction of options markets
would be expected to reduce bid-ask spreads in the stock 
market.
Furthermore, if there is a link between a market's 
operational efficiency and it's informational efficiency, 
the introduction of options markets should improve the 
informational efficiency of the stock market. This may 
explain the tendency documented by Jennings and Starks 
[36] for stocks with exchange traded options to respond 
more rapidly to the release of earnings announcements 
than stocks for which exchange traded options are not 
available.
The results presented in Chapter V suggest that there 
is much that we do not understand about the nature of the 
relation between the market spread for CBOE options and 
adverse selection and inventory holding costs. Given 
that the options in the present sample are relatively 
heavily traded and written on closely monitored firms, 
finding the adverse selection / holding cost component 
insignificantly different from zero would not necessarily 
suggest a problem. However,negative observations for 
this component have no meaning in the theory on which the 
model is founded. Whether the adverse selection 
component is interpreted as compensation for trading with 
informed traders or as an expectation revision, there is 
no economic reason to observe a negative value.
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Likewise, as long as dealers are risk averse, the holding 
cost component of the spread should be nonnegative.
On the other hand, the number and magnitude of the 
negative observations is small and may simply be an 
artifact of the small cross-section under consideration.
If this is true, it is worth considering whether we should 
be surprised by the fact that there is no evidence of a 
positive adverse selection / holding cost component in 
the spreads of the CBOE options in the present sample. 
Recall that Choi, Salandro, and Shastri [10] draw a 
similar conclusion from a much larger sample of CBOE 
options.
The evidence that adverse selection influences the 
market spreads on NYSE stocks is compelling. Glosten and 
Harris [22] measure an adverse selection / holding cost 
component in the spreads on stocks of firms which are, 
presumably, also relatively heavily traded and closely 
monitored. They also present evidence that this 
component is positively related to several proxies for 
the specialist's perception of the level of information 
trading. Coupled with Hasbrouck's [27] observation of 
both transitory and persistent effects of trades on quote 
revisions, there appears to be strong evidence that NYSE 
prices tend to fluctuate in a manner that is consistent 
with the predictions of adverse selection and inventory
management theories of price adjustment.
Given this evidence, the first question that comes to 
mind is whether the nature of providing dealer services 
in the options market differs in any important ways from 
that of providing similar services in the stock market. 
The most salient difference in the options market is the 
dealer's opportunity to exercise any option held in 
inventory. In addition to providing an inventory 
management opportunity, this limits the dealer's exposure 
to the impact of adverse information.
Despite this opportunity, Ho and Macris [28] present 
evidence suggesting that adverse selection and/or 
inventory holding costs do influence the prices set by 
option specialists on the AMEX. However, it should be 
noted that Ho and Macris may have introduced an important 
selection bias by confining their attention to a set of 
thinly traded options. As Hasbrouck suggests, thinly 
traded securities are likely to be those exhibiting the 
largest holding cost component. On the other hand, it 
was expected that focusing on periods associated with the 
release of earnings announcement, as was done in Chapter 
V, would introduce a similar bias with respect to the 
importance of adverse selection. Thus, it appears 
unlikely that characteristics of options alone explain 
the results reported here and elsewhere for CBOE options.
Alternatively, differences in the trading mechanism 
on the CBOE may contribute to our inability to detect an 
adverse selection / holding cost component in market 
spreads. Recall that while both the AMEX and NYSE are 
specialist markets, trade on the CBOE is conducted 
through a group of competitive market makers. The 
discussion in Chapter III suggests that interaction among 
dealers may reduce the magnitude of the market spread as 
well as each of it's individual components. Furthermore, 
not modelling this interaction was shown to introduce 
noise into the estimation procedure employed in Chapter 
V.
This argument has two major weaknesses. First, while 
his work is at a very early stage, Stoll [54] detects a 
relatively large adverse selection component in the 
market spreads observed under the NASDAQ competitive 
dealer system for OTC stocks. More importantly, the 
tendency for individual orders to be divided among the 
competing market makers on the CBOE is similar to 
interdealer trade in its effect on dealer pricing 
behavior. When interdealer trade is relatively fluid, as 
it would be when orders are divided among the market 
makers as they reach the market, differences among 
dealers associated with their current inventory positions 
will be mitigated. In the absence of such differences we
should expect little difference between the spreads 
quoted by a specialist and the market spread generated by 
a group of competitive market makers.
The tendency to split orders has a potentially more 
important consequence in the present context. The 
empirical model employed in Chapter V effectively 
measures the correlation between price changes and trade 
type and size. Taking a price change as being associated 
with several trades rather than a single larger trade 
obviously influences the observed correlation between 
price changes and this characteristic of the order flow. 
For example, consider a single buy order reported as 
three trades of equal size which induces a l/8th increase 
in the next bid and ask quotes. While the shift in the 
spread is a consequence of a single relatively large 
trade, the data will suggest that two smaller trades had 
no effect on market prices while a third trade of equal 
size induced an upward shift in market prices. Thus not 
only will the relation between trade type and price 
changes be influenced, but, so will be the relation 
between trade size and price changes as an apparently 
small trade induces a relatively large price movement. 
Based on discussions with traders on the floor of the 
CBOE, this could be a major source of noise in the data, 
particulary during periods of relatively heavy trade and
for more heavily traded option classes. Most likely it 
is also a much less important source of noise in data 
drawn from the specialist systems on the NYSE and AMEX or 
from the computerized NASDAQ system where there is no 
apparent mechanism by which competing dealers could 
divide individual orders among themselves.
The fact that price quotes are drawn from a discrete 
set coupled with the relatively low prices of options may 
also contribute to difficulty in detecting the influence 
of adverse selection or inventory management strategies 
were they present. If the adverse selection / holding 
cost component leads to relatively small price revisions 
as suggested by both Glosten and Harris' and Ho and 
Macris' results, it seems likely that when the minimum 
price change is large relative to the current price, 
there will be a much lower probability of detecting 
revisions associated with adverse selection or inventory 
management strategies. The discussion in Section IV of 
Chapter V suggested that price discreteness may play an 
important role in the present sample.
While Glosten and Harris [22] suggest that the 
unmodelled effects of discreteness may not have a large 
impact on estimates of the adverse selection / holding 
cost component, casual observation of Ho and Macris' [28] 
Tables I and II suggests otherwise. In particular, Ho
and Macris report six cases in which their estimate of 
the adverse selection / holding cost component is not 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level in a 
one-tailed test. Of these six, five are associated with 
options whose average price during the sample period was 
less than $2.00. Of the remaining eight options in their 
sample, only three had average prices less than $2.00.
The lowest of these prices, $1.38, was higher than all 
but two of the prices for those options not exhibiting a 
significant adverse selection / holding cost component.
In the present sample only five of the base options under 
consideration have average prices greater than $2.00 over 
days +2 and +3. On the other hand, nine out of twenty 
have average prices less than $1.00 during the same 
per iod.
In retrospect, it seems likely that these two sources 
of noise in the data may have significantly influenced 
the results reported in Chapter V and far outweighed any 
distortion induced by the occasional inability to observe 
without error whether a trade was the result of a buy or 
sell order. Despite these problems some comfort can be 
taken from the fact that both the results reported in 
Chapter IV and those reported by Choi, Salandro, and 
Shastri suggest that our estimates of the market spread 
are highly correlated with the average quoted spread.
This suggests that, as in Glosten and Harris' analysis of 
the NYSE and Ho and Macris' analysis of AMEX options, the 
relative importance of adverse selection and inventory 
management strategies in determining the market spread is 
small.
The preceeding discussion suggests several 
possibilities for improving upon the analyses of Chapter 
V. First, as was discussed in Chapter IV, how we specify 
whether a trade was the result of a buy or sell order for 
trades not occurring at current bid or ask prices does 
not appear to influence the conclusions drawn concerning 
the composition of the spread. This suggests returning 
to a simpler estimation procedure which would then permit 
consideration of a much broader cross-section of earnings 
announcements.
Apparently more important is the noise introduced by 
errors in the reporting of trades and price discreteness. 
Harris [26] proposes a method for modelling price 
discreteness in the present context. However, this 
places us in a situation where once again the complexity 
of the estimation procedure place a restriction on the 
feasible sample size. Perhaps a better alternative is to 
choose a relatively high priced option to which trades in 
other options will be standardized. In the present case 
a near-the-money, near maturity option was chosen for its
desirable option pricing characteristics and because it 
was typically the most heavily traded option in the 
class. By choosing a higher priced in-the-money option 
it would be necessary to standardize more trades but 
since the standardization procedure does not rely on 
option pricing models, nothing is lost with regard to the 
accuracy of the standardization procedure.
Finally, the problems associated with errors in the 
reporting of orders divided among several market makers 
can be minimized by examining relatively lightly traded 
classes of options. In addition to reducing this source 
of error, this approach biases one toward observing a 
significant adverse selection / holding cost component.
At this point, it appears that following these 
guidelines may lead to a better understanding of the 
composition of the market bid-ask spreads of CBOE 
options. Only when such understanding is gained does it 
seem likely that further insight into the operational / 
informational efficiency link will be gained within the 
present methodological framework.
Endnotes
1. In contrast to the continuous dealer market, Ho, 
Schwartz, and Whitcomb [29] show the difference between 
the clearing price and volume and Pareto efficient values 
in a call market with friction. Their analysis has 
implications for the major continuous dealer markets 
because, despite the fact that most domestic financial 
markets trade continuously, they often are opened with a 
call auction. Amihud and Mendelson [4] provide evidence 
of important differences between prices generated by the 
NYSE opening auction and those generated by the 
continuous trading process during the remainder of the 
d a y .
2. As used here, operational efficiency refers to the 
extent to which the existing market structure economizes 
the costs of trading in an imperfect market.
3. Amihud and Mendelson [3] argue that expected returns 
will be an increasing function of the cost of transacting 
in a security. Consistent with this argument, they find 
that a stock’s returns are positively related to it's 
bid-ask spread.
4. An alternative is to place a limit order and borrow 
or lend prior to execution of the order. However,
123
survival of the dealer function suggests that it is more 
efficient for some traders to obtain immediacy from a 
dealer. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb [11] point 
out that limit orders also provide an alternative source 
of immediacy. The importance of their insight is that 
while most of the literature assumes that all trade is 
conducted at the dealer's quotes, a large proportion of 
trade is actually conducted at prices set by orders in 
the limit order book. Thus, even specialist markets such 
as the NYSE and the AMEX are more accurately viewed as 
competitive dealer markets where investors placing limit 
orders compete with the specialist in the provision of 
dealer services.
5. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb [12] provide a 
detailed review of the earlier literature which 
emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the 
specialist's or competitive market maker's bid-ask spread 
and the market bid-ask spread.
6 . See also Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb [13] 
for a summary of their earlier work on the biases in beta 
estimates induced by cross-serial correlation. Cross­
serial correlation is the correlation between a 
security's return in one period and another security's or 
the market's return in another period. Such correlation
is believed to be a consequence of market friction which 
inhibits simultaneous reflection of new information in 
security prices.
7. Choi, Salandro, and Shastri are concerned exclusively 
with the issue of accurately estimating the quoted 
spread. Since the focus here is on attempts to examine 
the relative importance of the components of the spread, 
further discussion of their work is deferred to Chapter 
V.
8 . In a recent working paper Stoll [54] employs a 
somewhat different model in his analysis of a sample of 
OTC stocks traded through the NASDAQ system and concludes 
that 43% of the market quoted bid-ask spread is 
associated with adverse selection.
9. Actually, as Ho and Stoll [32] suggest, a "second 
best" price structure would be expected to prevail. The 
two dealers with the extreme inventory positions would 
still provide the market quotes, however, the quotes they 
provide will be determined by the next best quotes in the 
market. In other words, dealers able to quote the best 
prices take advantage of their temporary monopoly power 
by quoting prices infinitessimally better than the next 
best prices. The arguments below continue to obtain 
under second best pricing as long as N >.3.
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10. This suggests that after standardizing for the 
amount of risk in the underlying stock implied by a one 
contract transaction, the quoted bid-ask spread should be 
identical to the spread set for the underlying stock by a 
dealer with the same degree of risk aversion. This 
cross-market prediction is, in principle, testable. 
However, individual differences in dealer risk aversion 
are likely to cause persistent differences in marginal 
rates of substitution across markets if there are 
institutional impediments to interdealer trade. Thus, 
comparing standardized spreads from the options market to 
spreads in the stock market would require some means of 
controlling for potential differences in dealer risk 
aversion.
11. The interest rate input was the current 90 day T- 
Bill rate as reported in the Wall Street Journal. For 
dividend paying stocks only the nearest dividend paid 
during the remaining life of the option was used in 
calculations of the option's value and hedge ratio. 
Implied variances were calculated from two bid-ask quotes 
randomly chosen from the morning and the afternoon 
trading intervals for a near-the-money, near maturity 
option. The variances were obtained by inverting the 
American call formula using each of the four quotes as
the option price input. The average of the four was 
taken as the implied variance for the option class. This 
method of calculating the implied variance allows use 
of options which are expected to be priced most 
accurately and, assuming the implied variance reflects 
the average variance to maturity of the option, which are 
most free of the influence of future events. Thus it is 
assumed that option prices are a function of the 
instantaneous return variance of the underlying stock and 
the implied variance is then used as a proxy for this 
value. It is also worth noting that the implied 
variances we obtained are quite similar to the historical 
variances reported by Cox and Rubinstein [15].
12. A correction for heteroscedasticity was made by 
assuming that the error structure was known and 
estimating equation (5) using generalized least squares. 
In the present case the heteroscedasticity in the error 
term is a consequence of the individual standardized 
spreads having unique variances. These variance are 
assumed to differ only across call options. Thus, the GLS 
estimator is a weighted least squares estimator where the 
weight on an observation from a particular option is the 
inverse of the standard error of that option's 
standardized spread.
13. In fact, if one were to randomly choose a pair of 
options from the class and conduct a t-test for 
differences in means, it would be possible to draw the
misleading conclusion that the simple form of the model
presented in equation (4) should not be rejected.
14. As will become clear in the next section, this 
specification of the probability of a reverse transaction
is rather simplistic. The reason for this is that it is
not necessary for a transaction to be in the same option 
to reverse the current effects of a trade on the dealer's 
(implicit stock) inventory. In other words, the dealer 
should be indifferent between an offsetting trade in the 
same option and a properly weighted (presumably, by the 
ratio of the two options' hedge ratios) trade in another 
option. Thus, the specification used in equation (6) is 
a simplification of a considerably more complicated 
process.
15. Equation (6) could be estimated using data from 
individual quotes if we were willing to use a variable 
such as the time between transactions as a measure of 
trading activity. However, it would not be possible to 
match each bid-ask quote with a transaction. In an 
effort to maintain consistency throughout the analysis 
quote data is used whenever possible. To that end, the
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number of bid-ask quotes is used as a measure of trading 
activity rather than the number of transactions during 
the day. The correlation between the number of bid-ask 
quotes and the number of transactions in an option is 
0.77 with a p-value of 0.0001.
16. Recalling equation (3), the specification of 
equations (6) and (7) effectively constrains the 
coefficients on an option's hedge ratio and price 
elasticity to 1.0. Relaxing this constraint by 
estimating equation (3) in log form provided 
qualitatively similar results. In particular, the number 
of quotes entered with a negative sign as in equation (6) 
while both the stock price and return variance had 
coefficients significantly less than 1.0 as did the 
product of the hedge ratio and elasticity.
17. It is also worth noting that while the lowest priced 
options are quoted in l/16ths, these are also the options 
whose quotes, as a consequence of price discreteness, may 
diverge most from true reservation prices on a relative 
basis.
18. This view of the dealer's inventory management 
problem is consistent with the views expressed during 
discussions with both CBOE market makers and an AMEX 
option specialist.
19. When a transaction occurs at the quoted bid or ask 
price, it is safe to infer that the transaction was a 
consequence of a sell or buy order. However, for the 
small proportion of trades not executed at either of the 
current quotes D is unobservable thus biasing ordinary 
least squares parameter estimates for equation (11). The 
maximum likelihood method used to estimate equation (11) 
is discussed in Chapter V. For a complete description 
see Jameson and Wilhelm [35].
20. Ho and Macris assume that equilibrium returns follow 
a Wiener process with drift
In(Pj/Pi-i) = H(t} - tj_i) + v(tj - t ) ej
2where e ~ N(0, cr ) and serially uncorrelated. Thus, it 
is necessary to divide through (11) by v(tj - tj.̂ ) to 
obtain a homoscedastic error term. The estimates 
reported in Table IV are derived from estimating this 
form of the model.
21. In Chapter V it will be shown that if in fact the 
dealer attempts to rebalance his inventory through his 
placement of the spread (0 ? 0.0 in equation (11)), using 
equation (11) to estimate 2YP provides an estimate of the 
quoted spread even if an informational component is 
present.
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22. As Glosten [21] points out, Roll's estimator is a 
downward biased estimate of the quoted spread when 
information is revealed through the flow of orders to the 
market.
23. The obvious way to employ the intuition in equation
*(12) would be to use Sj as an input to an option pricing 
formula to obtain y {. This was attempted using the 
Geske/Johnson [20] and Roll [48]/Whaley [59] models to 
obtain implied stock prices from put and call options, 
respectively. Using this approach yielded standardized 
transaction prices that deviated considerably from the 
most recently quoted bid and ask prices. The problem was 
most pronounced when standardizing away-from-the-money 
options, suggesting biases in the option pricing models. 
The corresponding spread estimates were similarly 
affected.
24. For example, a transaction price at the midpoint of 
the current spread for option n was translated to the 
midpoint of the current spread for option 1. A problem 
with this approach is that it does not allow, for 
example, a transaction at the ask price in an option that 
is in-the-money relative to option 1 to be translated to 
a price greater than option l's ask price as it should be 
if the dealer's reservation ask price is an increasing
function of standardized trade size. On the other hand, 
if the dealer's price schedule is relatively elastic, 
volume adjustments are relatively less important and the 
bias introduced by this approach is almost certainly less 
than that associated with the option pricing formula 
based approach. Jameson and Wilhelm [34] find that the 
market price schedules on the CBOE are in fact relatively 
elastic.
25. Given the translated price, y{, we obtained v{ from
V- = Vi(Yj/ Y-) .
This relation assumes that
(Yj/ y }) = (dj/ a}) .
While we know that this is not true, the difference 
between the two ratios approaches zero when the option in 
which the ith transaction took place is deep-out-of-the- 
money, an option for which measurement bias in <5j would 
be expected to be particularly severe.
26. Venkatesh and Chiang's definition of a nonroutine 
announcement is related to the observation that earnings 
and dividend announcements are often made within a few 
days of one another if not on the same day. A nonroutine 
announcement is one that follows the other by at least 
ten days but not by more than thirty days.
27. Each of the analyses reported later was also
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conducted using only transactions in the base option. 
While this approach provided less accurate estimates of 
the bid-ask spread, it did not lead to conclusions 
regarding the composition of the spread that differed 
qualitatively from those discussed in Section IV.
28. In an earlier draft of the paper the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval Service (Broad Tape) was used to determine the 
time of day (to the minute) at which the earnings 
announcement was made public. Examination of the thirty 
minute intervals on either side of the time of the 
release provided no insight beyond that obtained with the 
coarser partition of the data employed here.
29. If f2(t ) is not constant, the error term will be 
heteroscedastic. One solution is to model the error 
variance as a function of the time between trades. 
However, Glosten and Harris point out that if returns are 
stationary in transaction time, measured by the quantity 
of information arriving in the market, this is not a 
problem. The model was estimated under both assumptions 
with little qualitative difference in the results. The 
estimates reported later are those obtained under the 
assumption that the errors are homoscedastic.
30. Glosten and Harris also include an adjustment for
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f
discreteness in prices developed by Harris [26]. As 
Harris demonstrates, estimates of C will be biased upward 
when discreteness is not modelled, a contention supported 
by the empirical evidence reported by Glosten and Harris 
which also suggests that estimates of Z are relatively 
insensitive to whether or not discreteness is modelled.
It is worth noting that while options generally trade at 
lower prices than stocks, thereby aggravating the 
discreteness problem, prices on low priced options are 
quoted in l/16ths rather than l/8ths.
31. The proxy used for the unobservable Qs in the OLS 
procedure is the expectation,
E ( Q ) = 2Pr(Buy) - 1 , 
where Pr(Buy) is defined by equation (11).
32. Given the dissimilarities in conclusions, it is 
worth noting the differences in the methods used to 
calculate the probability of reversal. It was pointed 
out in Section III that in the present study the maximum 
likelihood procedure yields probabilities associated with 
each trade. On the other hand Stoll and Choi, Salandro, 
and Shastri assume that the probability of reversal is 
constant during the sample period. Stoll then infers 
this probability from a pair of OLS parameter estimates 
representing the relation between the bid-ask spread and
the covariances of successive price and quote changes. 
Choi, Salandro, and Shastri employ a maximum likelihood 
method which chooses it to maximize the likelihood of 
observing a given sequence of buy and sell orders.
Table I
T e s t  S t a t i s t i c s  f o r  t h e  F - T e s t  o f  t h e  N u l l  H y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  
M e a n  S t a n d a r d i z e d  Q u o t e d  B i d - A s k  S p r e a d  i s  I d e n t i c a l  
W i t h i n  a  C l a s s  o f  C a l l  O p t i o n s
F i r m N T F
B C 1 2 7 0 8 9 0 . 9 6
E K 1 1 5 9 4 4 6 . 9 1
F D X 1 5 6 5 3 7 9  . 5 6
H O N 1 1 8 1 5 1 7 2 . 0 0
I B M 1 3 8 4 2 1 9 5 . 1 2
L I T 1 7 9 3 1 1 2 8 . 9 4
N S M 9 7 3 6 2 2 7  . 8 1
S O C 1 7 2 6 0 5 4 4 2 . 1 7
T D Y 1 4 1 2 5 5 1 6 7 . 7 8
W C I 1 3 7 1 4 3 1 3 . 8 6
N  i s  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  c a l l  o p t i o n s  f o r  w h i c h  b i d - a s k  q u o t e s  w e r e  p r o v i d e d  o n  J a n u a r y  2 7 ,  1 9 8 2 .
T  i s  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  b i d - a s k  q u o t e s  s u m m e d  o v e r  t h e  N  c a l l  o p t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  c l a s s .
I f  t h e  n u l l  h y p o t h e s i s  i s  t r u e ,  F  i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  a s  a n  F  r a n d o m  v a r i a b l e  w i t h  N - l  a n d  T - N  d e g r e e s  o f  f r e e d o m .
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Table II
M e a n  V a l u e s  and S t a n d a r d  E r r o r s  (in p a r entheses) for S e l e c t e d  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of  Nati o n a l  S e m i c o n d u c t o r  (NSM) Call Op t i o n s  T r a d e d  on  the C B O E
(January 27, 1982)
Maturi ty (month)/ Str i k e Q u o t e dS p r e a d Stdrdzd.S p r e a d
M i d p o i n t  of  Quot e d  S p r e a d
PricingF o rmulaValue He d g eR a t i o StockPrice
NumberofQuotes
2/15 0 . 1 7 6 2  (0.8630) 0 . 8 4 2 4(0.0150) 4.44 8 8(0.2812) 4.5419(0.2892) 0 . 9 8 4 6(0.8047) 19.393(0.2937) 166
5 /1 5 0 . 2 0 4 2(0.0671) 0 . 0 7 1 3(0.0235) 5 . 3 7 3 2(0.2315) 5.4085(0.2489) 0.8921(0.0096) 19.468(0.2789) 71
8/15 0 . 2 4 6 2  ( 0.1087) 0 . 1 0 4 4  (0.8463) 6 . 1 7 2 4 (0.2489) 6.1458(8.2261) 0 . 8 6 3 7(0.0079) 19.440(0.2613) 33
2/20 0 . 0 7 5 0(0.0258) 8 . 8 1 4 5(0.0049) 0 . 7 7 2 9(0.1128) 0.8244 (8.1455) 8 . 4 6 7 2(0.0511) 19.462(0.3167) 115
5/ 2 0 0 . 0 9 4 0(0.0358) 0 . 8 3 3 0(0.0126) 2.1321 (0.1400) 2.2636(0.1699) 0 . 5 7 5 8(0.0216) 19.441(0.2952) 155
8/2 0 8.1861 (0.0625) 0.8801(0.8271) 2.99 8 6 (0.1404) 3.2788 (0.1618) 0 . 6 2 5 4(0.0135) 19.459(0.2568) 43
2/2 5 8 . 0 6 4 7(0.0116) 0 . 8 9 8 9(0.8221) 0.1284(0.0348) 0.0332(0.0087) 0 . 0 3 5 3(0.0077) 19.558(0.2443) 28
5 / 2 5 0. 0 8 3 3  (8.0295) 8 . 8 4 5 2(8.8162) 0.77 7 2(0.0773) 0.7919(0.8722) 0 . 2 7 3 5(0.0164) 19.525(0.2671) 69
8/25 0 . 1 2 9 5(8.0612) 0 . 0 7 1 0(0.0326) 1.3784(0.0753) 1.6005 (0.1040) 0.3 8 6 4(0.0144) 19.435(0.2693) 56
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Table III.A
E s t i m a t e d  C o e f f i c i e n t s  a n d  t - S t a t i s t i c s  ( i n  P a r e n t h e s e s )  f r o m  
T h r e e - S t a g e  L e a s t  S q u a r e s  E s t i m a t i o n  o f  
l n S P D n; = a + flilnSj + (32lncrs + f3 3X n Q ni + B^lnT„i + e ni (6)
a 01 (32 03 04 M S E
1 . 2 1 2( 1 . 4 7 ) 0. 4 1 0  ( 4 . 7 3 ) 0 . 7 5 4  ( 5 . 7 8 ) 0. 5 3 4  ( 0 . 4 5 ) - 1 . 2 5 6  ( - 2 . 4 8 ) 3 . 4 6 6
T h e  r e g r e s s i o n  is b a s e d  o n  t h e  1 2 2  c a l l  o p t i o n s  f o r  w h i c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e c o r d s  w e r e  a v a i l a b l e  o n  J a n u a r y  2 7 ,  1 9 8 2 .
M S E  i s  t h e  s y s t e m  w e i g h t e d  M e a n  S q u a r e  E r r o r  b a s e d  o n  3 5 3  d e g r e e s  o f  f r e e d o m .
T a b l e  I I I . B
E s t i m a t e d  C o e f f i c i e n t s  a n d  t - S t a t i s t i c s  ( i n  P a r e n t h e s e s )  f r o m  
O r d i n a r y  L e a s t  S q u a r e s  E s t i m a t i o n  o f  
l n S P D n; = a  + O j l n S j  + djlnffs + 3 ] l n H nj l- f^lnD,,; + e„j (7)
a |3j 02 $3 04 MSE
- 5 . 9 7 9  0 . 4 6 3  0 . 8 0 9  0 . 3 0 5  0 . 7 8 5  0 . 2 1 8( - 1 3 . 8 4 )  ( 4 . 3 6 )  ( 9 . 1 0 )  ( 6 . 5 8 )  ( 1 2 . 4 8 )
A d j u s t e d  R * :  0 . 6 3 7  F: 5 4 . 1 1 8
T h e  r e g r e s s i o n  is  b a s e d  o n  t h e  1 2 2  c a l l  o p t i o n s  f o r  w h i c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e c o r d s  w e r e  a v a i l a b l e  o n  J a n u a r y  2 7 ,  1 9 8 2 .
Table IV
B i d - A s k  S p r e a d  E s t i m a t e s  B a s e d  o n  T r a n s a c t i o n  P r i c e s  C o r  a n  
I n d i v i d u a l  O p t i o n  a n d  o n  T r a n s a c t i o n  P r i c e s  f o r  a l l  O p t i o n s  o n  
t h e  S a m e  U n d e r l y i n g  S t o c k  ( D o l l a r s  p e r  O p t i o n )
F i r m  ( M a t u r i t y /  S t r i k e )
A v e r a g eQ u o t e dS p r e a d
E s t  i m a t e d  ( I n d  i v i d u a l  2 Y P
S p r e a d  O p t i  o n s ) 2 v - C O V
E s t i m a t e d  S p r e a d  ( A l l  O p t i o n s )  2 Y P  2 v - C O V
B C( 3 / 2 5 ) 0 . 1 4 0 9 0 . 0 9 1 3 0 . 0 9 2 3 0 . 1 0 9 3 0 . 1 1 9 5
E K( 4 / 7 0 ) 0 . 1 6 2 0 0 . 1 1 6 2 0 . 0 8 3 6 0 . 1 2 9 2 0 . 1 1 4 5
F D X( 4 / 5 5 ) 0 . 1 8 4 4 0 . 0 9 4 3 0 . 1 9 0 6 0 . 1 6 6 5 0 . 1 8 1 0
H O N( 2 / 7 0 ) 0 . 0 9 2 3 0 . 0 7 1 3 0 . 0 3 7 6 0 . 0 8 8 2 0 . 1 0 1 8
I B M( 4 / 6 0 ) 0 . 1 6 1 4 0 . 0 9 1 5 0 . 0 7 6 9 0 . 1 2 3 6 0 . 1 2 9 1
L I T( 3 / 5 0 ) 0 . 1 6 5 3 0 . 0 9 8 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 * 0 . 1 0 6 7 0 . 1 0 2 2
N S M( 2 / 2 0 ) 0 . 0 7 5 0 0 . 0 5 8 9 0 . 0 4 6 9 0 . 0 5 9 9 0 . 0 6 2 7
S O C( 3 / 3 0 ) 0 . 1 6 8 3 0 . 1 2 7 6 0 . 0 6 8 4 0 . 1 9 2 5 0 . 2 7 5 2
T D Y( 4 / 1 3 0 ) 0 . 1 9 3 5 0 . 1 3 4 6 0 . 1 2 9 4 0 . 1 7 5 9 0 . 2 1 9 8
tfCI( 2 / 5 5 ) 0 . 1 7 7 9 0 . 1 1 7 0 0 . 1 0 5 7 0 . 1 4 7 4 0 . 1 4 9 3
M e a n  D e v i a t i o n  Q u o t e d  S p r e a d f r o m 0 . 0 5 2 0 0 . 0 5 8 3 0 . 0 2 2 2 0 . 0 0 6 6
R o o t  M e a n  S q u a r e d  E r r o r 0 . 0 5 6 2 0 . 0 6 5 6 0 . 0 3 0 5 0 . 0 4 5 8
C o r r e l a t i o n  B e t w e e n  Q u o t e d  a n d  E s t i m a t e d  S p r e a d
0 . 8 4 9 7 0 . 5 4 2 0 0 . 8 4 9 4 0 . 6 5 9 7
* T h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  a d j a c e n t  r e t u r n s  w a s  p o s i t i v e  a n d  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  z e r o .
Table V
D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s  F o r  t h e  T h r e e  S a m p l e  P e r i o d s  ( P r i c e  a n d  t r a d e  s i z e  s t a t i s t i c s  a r e  i n  b a s e  o p t i o n  u n i t s )
(D a y s - 1 2 ,  - 1 1 ) (D a y s - 2 ,  - 1 ,  0) (D a y s + 2 ,  + 3 )
M e a n S t d .  D e v . M e a n S t d .  D e v . M e a n S t d . D e v .
N u m b e r  o fP r i c eC h a n g e s 2 3 8 . 8 0 1 7 4 . 8 1 3 8 7  . 4 5 3 0 0 . 3 8 2 6 3 . 5 5 1 5 9 . 6 2
M e a n  T i m e  B e t w e e n  T r a d e s  (m i n s  . )
5 . 5 9 5 . 2 8 4 . 9 0 4 . 5 8 3 . 68 2 .18
S t d .  D e v . a (m i n s  . ) 8 . 7 4 7 . 4 7 7 . 99 7 . 0 9 6 . 01 4 . 3 5
M e a n  T r a d e  S i z e(c o n t r a c t s ) 1 6  . 07 1 1 . 6 8 1 7  .19 1 2  . 39 2 4  . 2 0 38 . 82
S t d .  D e v . a (c o n t r a c t s ) 6 2 . 7 5 6 9  . 6 2 5 5 . 1 0 6 4 . 3 0 6 4  . 0 6 1 4 9  . 30
M e a n  P r i c e  P e r  O p t i o n 2 . 0 1 1 . 7 4 1. 5 6 1 . 3 8 1 . 5 4 1. 5 1
S t d .  D e v . a 0 . 2 2 0 . 1 6 0 . 2 0 0 . 1 5 0 .17 0 . 1 6
S t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n s  i n  t i m e  b e t w e e n  t r a d e s ,  t r a d e  s i z e ,  a n d  o p t i o n  p r i c e  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m s .
Table VI
R e g r e s s i o n  R e s u l t s  f o r  D a y s  - 2 ,  - 1 ,  0, + 2, +3.F o r  E a c h  F i r m  t h e  T h r e e  S e t s  o f  P a r a m e t e r  E s t i m a t e s  a r e  M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d ,  W e i g h t e d  L e a s t  S q u a r e s ,  a n d  O r d i n a r y  L e a s t  S q u a r e s  E s t i m a t e s .  ( t - S t a t i s t i c s  i n  P a r e n t h e s e s )
F i r m Pi 02 03 03
A v e r a g e  Q u o t e d  S p r e a d  ( - 2 , - 1 , 0 )  ( T o t a l )
A H S 0 . 0 5 1 3  ( 1 3 . 8 6 ) 0 . 0 0 0 1  ( 0 . 0 2 ) - 7 . 7 6 E - 8  ( - 0 . 0 6 ) - 1 . 3 1 E - 6  ( - 0 . 6 9 ) 0 . 1 4 6 7  ( 3 0 4  ) 0 . 1 6 7 5  ( 5 2 8  )
0 . 0 3 9 9( 1 0 . 5 2 ) 0 . 0 0 0 7  ( 0 . 1 4 ) 4 . 7 6 E - 7  ( 0 . 3 7 ) - 1 . 2 8 E - 6  ( - 0 . 6 1 )
0 . 0 7 9 5( 2 0 . 5 8 ) - 0 . 0 0 9 2  ( - 1 . 8 8 ) 6 . 3 7 E - 8  ( 0 . 0 5 ) - 1 . 4 1 E - 6( - 0 . 7 7 )
A P A 0 . 0 3 5 6  ( 1 3 . 5 4 ) 0 . 0 0 5 1  ( 1 . 0 7 ) 9 . 4 1 E - 7  ( 0 . 6 0 ) - 1 . 4 8 E - 6  ( - 0 . 6 5 ) 0 . 1 2 2 7  ( 1 0 7  ) 0 . 1 2 9 5  ( 2 7 8  )
0 . 0 2 7 1( 8 . 6 6 ) 0 . 0 0 3 2( 0 . 6 7 ) 8 . 0 5 E - 7  ( 0 . 3 0 ) - 1 . 4 8 E - 6  ( - 0 . 8 5 )
0 . 0 5 5 7  ( 1 9 . 5 4 ) - 0 . 0 0 4 7  ( - 1 . 1 1 ) 5 . 4 7 E - 7  ( 0 . 5 3 ) - 1 .  2 5 E - 6  ( - 0 . 9 8 )
A V P 0 . 0 2 4 6  ( 1 0 . 9 9 ) 0 . 0 2 9 7  ( 9 . 3 4 ) - 5 . 3 7 E - 7  ( - 1 . 3 8 ) 5 . 3 8 E - 7( 1 . 0 2 ) 0 . 1 2 8 5  ( 2 1 7 ) 0 . 1 0 5 0  ( 4 8 4  )
0 . 0 2 0 5  ( 8 . 1 7 ) 0 . 0 2 0 4  ( 5 . 7 2 ) - 5 . 7 6 E - 7  ( - 1 . 2 4 ) - 1 . 6 2 E - 7  ( - 0 . 2 5 )
0 . 0 3 9 8( 1 5 . 0 3 ) 0 . 0 2 3 0  ( 6 . 4 7 ) - 3 . 7 2 E - 7( - 0 . 5 2 ) - 3 . 9 4 E - 7( - 0 . 3 8 )
B A 0 . 0 3 5 5( 1 7 . 1 7 ) - 0 . 0 0 0 3  ( - 0 . 1 2 ) - 6 . 3 8 E - 8  ( - 1 . 5 9 ) 1 . 6 4 E - 8  ( 0 . 1 9 ) 0 . 0 8 2 9  ( 9 2 3  ) 0 . 0 8 1 6  ( 1 5 4 3 )
0 . 0 3 3 9  ( 1 6 . 7 4 ) - 0 . 0 0 0 0  ( - 0 . 0 1 ) - 5 . 8 3 E - 8( - 1 . 5 5 ) 7 . 5 4 E - 9  ( 0 . 0 9 )
0 . 0 4 3 5( 1 9 . 9 0 ) 0 . 0 0 0 5  ( 0 . 1 8 ) - 6 . 9 0 E - 8  ( - 0 . 7 5 ) 4 . 4 2 E - 8  ( 0 . 3 7 )
a T h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  is  c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e a c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e c o r d  u s e d  i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s e s .  T h e  v a l u e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  a r e  s u b p e r i o d  a n d  t o t a l  s a m p l e  s i z e s .
Table VI
(Continued)
F i r m 0i 0 2 03 0(
A v e r a g e  Q u o t e d  S p r e a d  ( - 2 , - 1 , 0 )  ( T o t a l )
B A C 0 . 0 3 3 9  ( 1 1 . 4 6 ) 0 . 0 0 3 4  ( 0 . 8 2 ) 6 .1 9 E - 7  ( 0 . 7 0 ) - 8 . 7 0 E - 7  ( - 0 . 8 5 ) 0 . 0 8 7 0  ( 1 4 8 ) 0 . 0 8 2 7  ( 2 5 4  )
0 . 0 3 1 3  ( 1 0 . 0 5 ) 0 . 0 0 2 9  ( 0 . 7 0 ) 6 . 3 5 E - 7( 0 . 6 6 ) - 1 . 0 6 E - 6  ( - 0 . 9 7 )
0 . 0 3 9 0  ( 1 3 . 2 0 ) 0 . 0 0 4 4( 1 . 1 0 ) 4 . 8 6 E - 7  ( 0 . 5 8 ) - 6 . 9 7 E - 7  ( - 0 . 6 4 )
B A X 0 . 0 8 2 2( 1 5 . 3 9 ) 0 . 0 1 3 1( 1 . 9 1 ) - 5 . 0 4 E - 6( - 1 . 0 7 ) 4 . 0 0 E - 6  ( 0 . 8 3 ) 0 . 2 4 8 2  ( 3 7 3  ) 0 . 2 2 5 6  ( 6 4 6 )
0 . 0 7 1 8  ( 1 3 . 1 8 ) 0 . 0 0 8 4( 1 . 2 1 ) - 5 . 6 0 E - 6  ( - 1 . 1 2 ) 4 . 6 7 E - 6  ( 0 . 9 3 )
0 . 0 9 8 7  ( 2 0 . 1 5 ) 0 . 0 2 6 4  ( 4 . 1 8 ) - 1 . 2 0 E - 6  ( - 0 . 2 3 ) - 2 . 1 8 E - 7  ( - 0 . 0 4 )
B M Y 0 . 0 6 3 0( 1 2 . 9 2 ) 0 . 0 0 0 0  ( 0 . 0 0 ) - 4 . 1 8 E - 6 ( - 2 . 2 7 ) 2 . 0 0 E - 6  ( 0 . 5 9 ) 0 . 1 7 1 0( 2 9 5 ) 0 . 1 7 2 5  ( 4 2 8  )
0 . 0 4 3 0( 8 . 7 8 ) 0 . 0 0 6 2  ( 1 . 0 5 ) - 1 . 9 8 E - 6( - 0 . 9 6 ) 5 . 7 7 E - 7  ( 0 . 1 8 )
0 . 0 7 9 4  ( 1 7 . 5 4 ) 0 . 0 0 6 0  ( 1 . 0 9 ) - 3 . 3 7 E - 6  ( - 1 . 4 8 ) - 7  . 7 3 E - 7  ( - 0 . 1 9 )
B N I 0 . 0 9 9 7  ( 2 1 . 3 1 ) - 0 . 0 0 3 3( - 0 . 6 0 ) - 2 . 0 0 E - 6  ( - 1 . 9 4 ) 1 . 0 0 E - 6( 1 . 7 7 ) 0 . 2 6 1 5  ( 1 1 8 7 ) 0 . 2 6 6 9  ( 1 6 0 9  )
0 . 0 8 1 2( 1 6 . 2 4 ) 0 . 0 0 2 5  ( 0 . 4 4 ) - 1 . 5 0 E - 5( - 1 . 8 5 ) 1 . 4 0 E - 5( 1 . 7 2 )
0 . 1 4 2 3  ( 2 9 . 6 1 ) - 0 . 0 0 8 0  ( - 1 . 4 4 ) - 1 . 6 1 E - 5( - 2 . 0 9 ) 1 . 4 6 E - 5  ( 1 . 8 7 )
a T h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e a c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e c o r d  u s e d  i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s e s .  T h e  v a l u e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  a r e  s u b p e r i o d  a n d  t o t a l  s a m p l e  s i z e s .
Table VI
(Cont i nued)
F i r m 01 (32 P)
A v e r a g e  Q u o t e d  S p r e a d  ( - 2 , - 1 , 0 )  ( T o t a l )
C L 0 . 1 2 4 9  ( 2 2 . 4 7 ) - 0 . 0 4 3 0  ( - 6 . 5 5 ) - 1 . O O E - S  ( - 1 . 1 2 ) 1 . 0 0 E - 5  ( 1 . 0 7 ) 0 . 2 1 7 1  ( 6 1 7 ) 0 . 2 4 5 9  ( 9 2 3 )
0 . 1 1 2 3  ( 2 0 . 5 0 ) - 0  . 0 3 5 1  ( - 5 . 2 9 ) - 2 . 1 9 E - 5  ( - 2 . 1 3 ) 2 . 1 9 E - 5  ( 2 . 0 3 )
0 . 1 5 4 5  ( 2 9 . 4 8 ) - 0 . 0 4 8 1  ( - 7 . 6 8 ) - 1 . 3 4 E - 5  ( - 0 . 7 8 ) 1 . 8 I E - 5 ( 1 . 0 3 )
C S C 0 . 0 5 3 6( 8 . 4 3 ) 0 . 0 0 1 3  ( 0 . 1 1 ) 4 . 0 0 E - 7  ( 0 . 7 3 ) - 6 . 7 0 E - 6  ( - 1 . 0 1 )
0 . 1 4 4 6( 3 6 ) 0 . 1 4 1 1  ( 1 2 4  )
0 . 0 4 8 9( 7 . 8 3 ) - 0 . 0 0 1 2  ( - 0 . 1 1 ) 3 . 5 6 E - 6  ( 0 . 7 0 ) - 5 . 7 7 E - 6( - 1 . 0 0 )
0 . 0 6 9 9( 1 1 . 2 9 ) - 0 . 0 0 3 6  ( - 0 . 3 3 ) 1 . 0 7 E - 5  ( 1 . 7 9 ) - 1 . 6 1 E - 5  ( - 1 . 2 3 )
D O W 0 . 0 3 3 4  ( 1 3 . 7 6 ) - 0 . 0 0 5 2  ( - 1 . 6 1 ) - 4 . 1 0 E - 7  ( - 1 . 1 1 ) 9 . 1 0 E - 7  ( 0 . 9 8 ) 0 . 0 9 8 3( 3 9 1 )
0 . 0 9 8 1  ( 6 8 6  )
0 . 0 3 0 8  ( 1 3 . 2 5 ) - 0 . 0 0 5 4( - 1 . 7 4 ) - 4 . 0 5 E - 7  ( - 1 . 2 4 ) 7 . 8 2 E - 7  ( 0 . 8 9 )
0 . 0 4 9 2( 2 0 . 8 9 ) 0 . 0 0 0 4  ( 0 . 1 2 ) 2 . 5 3 E - 7  ( 0 . 4 1 ) 1 . 5 4 E - 6  ( 1 . 2 4 )
F 0 . 0 4 0 1  ( 1 9  . 1 9 ) 0 . 0 0 4 6( 1 . 6 6 ) - 6 . 0 5 E - 7( - 0 . 3 9 )
- 2 . 0 6 E - 6  ( - 0 . 6 5 ) 0 . 1 1 3 0( 2 7 6 ) 0 . 1 0 6 4( 4 2 1 )
0 . 0 3 7 5( 1 5 . 0 6 ) 0 . 0 0 1 2  ( 0 . 3 8 ) - 1 . 3 4 E - 6  ( - 0 . 8 4 )
- 1 . 6 3 E - 6  ( - 0 . 6 6 )
0 . 0 4 6 4( 2 6 . 9 5 ) 0 . 0 0 8 5( 3 . 7 9 ) - 9 . 7 2 E - 7  ( - 0 . 7 9 ) 1 . 0 4 E - 6  ( 0 . 4 6 )
a T h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e a c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e c o r d  u s e d  i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s e s .  T h e  v a l u e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  a r e  s u b p e r i o d  a n d  t o t a l  s a m p l e  s i z e s .
Table VI
(Cont i nued)
F i r m »1 02 03 0(
A v e r a g e  Q u o t e d  S p r e a d  ( - 2 , - 1 , 0 )  ( T o t a l )
F T X 0 . 0  2 5 4 ( 2 2 . 6 0 ) 0 . 0 0 1 5( 1 . 0 1 ) - 1 . 8 9 E - 7( - 0 . 4 9 )
1 . 5 3 E - 7( 0 . 3 9 ) 0 . 0 6 8 7  ( 8 1 4  ) 0 . 0 6 7 0  ( 1 4 0 8  )
0 . 0 2 4 3( 2 1 . 3 1 ) 0 . 0 0 0 6  ( 0 . 4 1 ) - 2 . 8 7 E - 7  ( - 0 . 7 2 ) 2 . 5 4 E - 7  ( 0 . 6 3 )
0 . 0 3 2 9  ( 3 1 . 8 1 ) 0 . 0 0 3 7  ( 2 . 7 4 ) - 3 . 6 6 E - 8  ( - 0 . 1 0 )
3 . 7 4 E - 8  ( 0 . 1 0 )
G E 0 . 0 4 7 4( 2 4 . 5 3 ) - 0 . 0 1 1 2  ( - 4 . 3 1 ) - 1 .  2 0 E - 6  ( - 2 . 2 7 )
9 . 7 6 E - 8  ( 0 . 1 3 ) 0 . 1 0 5 1  ( 4 9 8  ) 0 . 1 1 1 8  ( 9 0 2  )
0 . 0 4 0 3( 2 0 . 1 5 ) - 0 . 0 0 9 0( - 3 . 3 3 ) - 8 . 8 3 E - 7( - 1 . 7 9 )
5 . 4 6 E - 9  ( 0 . 0 1 )
0 . 0 6 3 6  ( 3 7 . 8 1 ) - 0 . 0 0 8 2( - 3 . 4 8 ) - 1 . 1 2 E - 6( - 3 . 3 0 )
7 . 8 5 E - 7  ( 1 . 0 9 )
G L W 0 . 0 4 5 1  ( 6 . 0 9 ) 0 . 0 1 0 4  ( 1 . 0 2 ) 4 . 3 5 E - 7  ( 0 . 1 5 )
1 . 6 5 E - 6( 0 . 3 6 ) 0 . 1 6 9 4( 1 5 5 ) 0 . 1 7 3 0( 3 0 1 )
0 . 0 4 2 0( 5 . 4 2 ) - 0 . 0 0 0 4  ( - 0 . 0 4 ) 5 . 3 5 E - 7( 0 . 1 9 )
- 7 . 8 6 E - 7  ( - 0 . 1 7 )
0 . 0 7 5 4  ( 8 . 4 3 ) 0 . 0 0 0 6  ( 0 . 0 5 ) - 2 . 2 7 E - 7  ( - 0 . 0 7 )
1 . 3 7 E - 6  ( 0 . 2 8 )
G W F 0 . 0 2 4 1  ( 4 . 1 5 ) 0 . 0 0 7 4  ( 1 . 1 7 ) 7 . 0 0 E - 6  ( 1 . 2 1 ) - 8 . 7 0 E - 6  ( - 1 . 5 6 )
0 . 0 9 5 5( 1 1 0 ) 0 . 0 9 7 3( 1 6 0 )
0 . 0 2 1 0  ( 4 . 1 2 ) - 0 . 0 0 1 6  ( - 0 . 2 7 ) 2 . 4 9 E - 6  ( 0 . 6 5 )
- 4 . 1 6 E - 6  ( - 1 . 0 4 )
0 . 0 3 9 8  ( 7 . 6 5 ) - 0 . 0 0 0 6  ( - 0 . 1 1 ) 8 . 9 3 E - 6  ( 2 . 1 1 ) - 9 . 5 1 E - 6  ( - 2 . 1 2 )
a T h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e a c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e c o r d  u s e d  i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s e s .  T h e  v a l u e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  a r e  s u b p e r i o d  a n d  t o t a l  s a m p l e  s i z e s .
Table VI
(Continued)
F i r m (3) P2 133 f3<
A v e r a g e  Q u o t e d  S p r e a d  ( - 2 , - 1 , 0 )  ( T o t a l )
IP 0 . 0 1 S 3  ( 3 . 6 1 ) 0 . 0 1 3 8  ( 2 . 3 1 ) - 3  . 3 8 E - 7  ( - 0 . 3 2 ) - 1 . 2 7 E - 6  ( - 0 . 7 6 ) 0 . 1 1 4 3( 1 6 3 )
0 . 0 9 9 2  ( 2 5 4  )
0 . 0 1 5 4  ( 3 . 2 8 ) 0 . 0 0 7 7  ( 1 . 3 2 ) - 3 . 1 5 E - 7( - 0 . 2 9 ) - 7 . 8 7 E - 7  ( - 0 . 4 8 )
0 . 0 3 0 4( 5 . 2 9 ) 0 . 0 1 9 8  ( 2 . 6 9 ) - 8 . 9 7 E - 7  ( - 0 . 6 8 ) - 7 . 1 2 E - 7  ( - 0 . 2 8 )
M M M 0 . 0 7 5 5( 1 9 . 2 0 ) - 0 . 0 2 0 7  ( - 3 . 9 1 ) - 2 . 7 1 E - 7( - 0 . 2 2 ) - 7 . 7 1 E - 7( - 0 . 5 3 )
0 . 1 7 5 9( 3 6 1 ) 0 . 1 7 9 6  ( 6 3 4  )
0 . 0 6 9 5  ( 1 7 . 9 5 ) - 0 . 0 1 9 4  ( - 3 . 6 7 ) - 2 . 0 0 E - 7  ( - 0 . 1 6 ) - 7 . 5 6 E - 7  ( - 0 . 5 0 )
0 . 0 9 8 5( 2 8 . 0 7 ) - 0 . 0 1 6 3  ( - 3 . 3 0 ) 1 . 9 1 E - 8( 0 . 0 2 ) - 8 . 7 2 E - 7  ( - 0 . 6 2 )
M R K 0 . 1 2 6 9  ( 1 5 . 5 9 ) 0 . 0 0 3 5( 0 . 2 9 ) 1 . 0 0 E - 6  ( 0 . 1 2 ) - 3 . 0 0 E - 5  ( - 1 . 6 5 )
0 . 4 5 5 4( 2 4 1 ) 0 . 4 2 4 9  ( 5 2 4  )
0 . 1 0 1 6  ( 1 2 . 2 3 ) - 0 . 0 0 0 1  ( - 0 . 0 1 ) - 3  . 6 3 E - 6  ( - 0 . 3 2 ) - 2 . 0 9 E - 5  ( - 1 . 2 2 )
0 . 1 9 3 2  ( 2 5 . 8 0 ) 0 . 0 2 0 4  ( 1 . 7 8 ) - 6 . 5 1 E - 6  ( - 0 . 6 2 ) 8 . 0 3 E - 6  ( 0 . 3 3 )
T 0 . 0 3 8 5  ( 1 6 . 6 8 ) 0 . 0 0 3 2  ( 1 . 0 6 ) - 9 . 6 1 E - 7  ( - 1 . 3 7 ) 9 . 5 0 E - 7  ( 1 . 1 9  ) 0 . 1 1 1 9  ( 5 3 3  )
0 . 1 0 1 9( 9 1 3 )
0 . 0 3 3 7  ( 1 5 . 3 8 ) 0 . 0 0 2 1( 0 . 7 2 ) - 7 . 3 7 E - 7  ( - 1 . 1 7 ) 5 . 9 2 E - 7( 0 . 8 0 )
0 . 0 4 7 9  ( 2 1 . 1 4 ) 0 . 0 0 4 5( 1 . 5 1 ) - 2 . 1 4 E - 7( - 0 . 1 8 ) 3 . 3 2 E - 7  ( 0 . 2 7 )
3 T h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e a c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e c o r d  u s e d  i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s e s .  T h e  v a l u e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  a r e  s u b p e r i o d  a n d  t o t a l  s a m p l e  s i z e s .
Table VII
R e g r e s s i o n  R e s u l t s  f o r  D a y s  - 1 2 ,  - 1 1 ,  + 2 ,  + 3 .F o r  E a c h  F i r m  t h e  T h r e e  S e t s  o f  P a r a m e t e r  E s t i m a t e s  a r e  M a x i m u m  L i k e l i h o o d ,  W e i g h t e d  L e a s t  S q u a r e s ,  a n d  O r d i n a r y  L e a s t  S q u a r e s  E s t i m a t e s .  ( t - S t a t i s t i c s  i n  P a r e n t h e s e s )
F i r m 01 02 03 0(
A v e r a g e  Q u o t e d  S p r e a d  ( - 1 2 , - 1 1 )  ( T o t a l )
A H S 0 . 0 5 1 9  (1.4 . 6 4  ) - 0  . 0 1 9 5  ( - 2 . 9 1 ) - 2  . 0 4 E - 7  ( - 0 . 1 8 ) - 5 . 7 0 E - 7  ( - 0 . 3 4 ) 0 . 1 0 8 6  ( 5 8  ) 0 . 1 7 7 7  ( 2 8 2  )
0 . 0 4 0 0  ( 1 0  . 8 9  ) - 0 . 0 1 1 0  ( - 1 . 4 7 ) 3 . 9 8 E - 7  ( 0 . 3 2 ) - 1 . 0 1 E - 6  ( - 0 . 5 6 )
0 . 0 8 1 4  ( 2 2 . 8 6 ) - 0 . 0 3 0 4( - 4 . 3 0 ) - 1 . 0 7 E - 7  ( - 0 . 1 0 ) 2 . 5 1 E - 7  ( 0 . 1 2 )
A P A 0 . 0 2 8 7( 6 . 4 8 ) 0 . 0 4 1 0  ( 5 . 9 1 ) 6 . 9  5 E - 7  ( 0 . 3 8 ) - 1 . 6 0 E - 5( - 1 . 6 5 ) 0 . 2 3 2 5  ( 1 1 4 ) 0 . 1 7 3 2  ( 2 5 8  )
0 . 0 2 7 1  ( 5 . 5 3 ) 0 . 0 3 0 5  ( 4 . 1 1 ) 7 . 6 7 E - 7  ( 0 . 3 7 ) - 1 . 4 2 E - 5  ( - 1 . 3 9 )
0 . 0 5 5 8  ( 1 1 . 5 9 ) 0 . 0 4 9 0  ( 6 . 8 7 ) 4 . 5 2 E - 7  ( 0 . 2 6 ) - 8 . 2 4 E - 6  ( - 0 . 7 0 )
A V P 0 . 0 2 3 1  ( 1 2 . 7 7 ) 0 . 0 0 7 8  ( 3 . 2 3 ) - 5 . 6 5 E - 7( - 1 . 7 6 ) 2 . 1 4 E - 7( 0 . 3 7 ) 0 . 0 8 3 9( 3 2 1 ) 0 . 0 8 4 8  ( 5 8 8  )
0 . 0 2 0 5  ( 1 1 . 2 9 ) 0 . 0 0 7 5  ( 3 . 1 4 ) - 5 . 7 1 E - 7  ( - 1 . 6 9 ) 1 . 2 3 E - 7  ( 0 . 2 2 )
0 . 0 4 0 1( 2 2 . 2 0 ) 0 . 0 0 2 0( 0 . 9 1 ) - 3 . 8 6 E - 7  ( - 0 . 8 0 ) 3 . 3 5 E - 7  ( 0 . 5 6 )
B A 0 . 0 3 5 7  ( 1 7 . 3 9 ) 0 . 0 2 1 4  ( 6 . 5 5 ) - 6 . 4 8 E - 7  ( - 1 . 5 9 ) - 9 . 0 1 E - 7  ( - 0 . 5 8 ) 0 . 1 3 0 3  ( 3 9 0  ) 0 . 0 9 3 0( 1 0 1 0 )
0 . 0 3 3 9  ( 1 6 . 5 4 ) 0 . 0 2 0 4  ( 6 . 4 5 ) - 5 . 8 1 E - 8  ( - 1 . 5 3 ) - 2 . 0 1 E - 6  ( - 1 . 6 3 )
0.0434( 2 0 . 5 4 ) 0 . 0 2 3 2  ( 7 . 1 2 ) - 6 . 7 3 E - 8  ( - 0 . 7 6 ) - 5 . 3 1 E - 7  ( - 0 . 2 5 )
3 T h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e a c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e c o r d  u s e d  i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s e s .  T h e  v a l u e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  a r e  s u b p e r i o d  a n d  t o t a l  s a m p l e  s i z e s .
Table VII
(Cont inued )









A v e r a g e  Q u o t e d  S p r e a d  ( - 1 2 , - 1 1 )  ( T o t a l )
B A C 0 . 0 3 2 7( 9 . 6 3 ) 0 . 0 7 7 5( 1 3 . 3 9 ) 6 . 9 2 E - 7( 0 . 6 8 ) - 2 . 5 8 E - 7  ( - 0 . 2 4 )
0 . 3 2 9 2( 4 5 ) 0 . 1 5 1 9( 1 5 1 )
0 . 0 3 0 9  ( 6 . 0 6 ) 0 . 0 6 6 0( 7 . 3 8 ) 6 . 7 9 E - 7  ( 0 . 4 3 ) - 1 . 8 0 E - 6 ( - 1 . 0 7 )
0 . 0 3 8 3  ( 1 4 . 0 0 ) 0 . 1 1 5 8  ( 2 1 . 8 6 ) 5 . 6 4 E - 7  ( 0 . 7 2 ) - 1 . 8 7 E - 6( - 1 . 9 6 )
B A X 0 . 0 8 6 0  ( 1 6 . 5 9 ) 0 . 0 5 2 5  ( 6 . 6 3 ) - 4 . 9 0 E - 6  ( - 1 . 0 6 ) - 4 . 1 9 E - 6  ( - 0 . 7 1 )
0 . 3 6 8 2  ( 1 6 6 ) 0 . 2 6 0 4  ( 4 3 9  )
0 . 0 7 1 9  ( 1 1 . 9 8  ) 0 . 0 4 1 6  ( 4 . 5 1 ) - 5 . 7 2 E - 6  ( - 1 . 0 5 ) 1 . 5 8 E - 6  ( 0 . 2 3 )
0 . 0 9 9 1( 2 0 . 0 6 ) 0 . 0 8 2 1  ( 1 0 . 3 9 ) - 1 . 5 4 E - 6  ( - 0 . 2 9 ) - 8 . 0 9 E - 7  ( - 0 . 1 3 )
B M Y 0 . 0 5 8 4( 9 . 6 2 ) 0 . 0 1 5 3  ( 1 . 9 0 ) - 3 . 5 9 E - 6  ( - 1 . 5 4 ) 2 . 4 0 E - 6  ( 1 . 6 7 )
0 . 2 4 1 3  ( 2 0 0  ) 0 . 2 1 5 1  ( 3 3 3 )
0 . 0 4 3 0( 7 . 2 7 ) 0 . 0 0 9 8  ( 1 . 2 7 ) - 1 . 9 7 E - 6( - 0 . 7 9 ) 2 . 4 3 E - 6  ( 0 . 9 4 )
0 . 0 7 9 5  ( 1 6 . 5 2 ) 0 . 0 3 6 4( 5 . 5 7 ) - 3 . 3 6 E - 6  ( - 1 . 3 9 ) 3 . 4 4 E - 6  ( 1 . 4 0 )
B N  I 0 . 1 0 2 4( 2 2 . 0 4 ) 0 . 0 4 4 1( 7 . 0 1 ) - 1 . 5 0 E - 5  ( - 1 . 9 5 ) 1 . 5 0 E - 5  ( 1 . 9 3 )
0 . 4 3 5 7  ( 4 9 6  ) 0 . 3 6 5 7  ( 9 1 8 )
0 . 0 8 1 2  ( 1 4 . 5 8 ) 0 . 0 4 2 1  ( 5 . 6 3 ) - 1 . 5 0 E - 5  ( - 1 . 6 6 ) 1 . 4 6 E - 5  ( 1 . 6 1 )
0 . 1 4 2 8( 3 2 . 9 8 ) 0 . 0 6 4 0( 1 1 . 0 1 ) - 1 . 6 5 E - 5  ( - 2 . 3 7 ) 1 . 6 6 E - 5  ( 2 . 3 8 )
3 T h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  is  c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e a c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e c o r d  u s e d  i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s e s .  T h e  v a l u e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  a r e  s u b p e r i o d  a n d  t o t a l  s a m p l e  s i z e s .
Table VII
(Confc inued)
F i r m 01 02 13) Hi
A v e r a g e  Q u o t e d  S p r e a d  ( - 1 2 , - 1 1 )  ( T o t a l )
C L 0 . 1 2 5 8  ( 1 9  . 7 2 ) - 0 . 0 4 0 0  ( - 3 . 8 4 ) - 1 . 0 0 E - 5  ( - 0 . 9 6 ) - 3 . 7 6 E - 6  ( - 0 . 2 7 ) 0 . 2 3 2 0  ( 1 6 7 ) 0 . 2 7 8 7  ( 3 0 6  )
0 . 1 1 1 8  ( 1 7  . 6 8 ) - 0 . 0 3 5 3( - 3 . 3 7 ) - 2 . 1 7 E - 5  ( - 1 . 8 2 ) 9 . 2 1 E - 6  ( 0 . 6 1 )
0 . 1 5 4 0( 2 4 . 8 4 ) - 0 . 0 4 0 0( - 3 . 8 8 ) - 1 . 2 8 E - 5  ( - 0 . 6 2 ) 3 . 5 4 E - 6  ( 0 . 1 6 )
C S C 0 . 0 5 0 7( 7 . 9 9 ) 0 . 0 1 4 0  ( 1 . 1 6 ) 3 . 9 0 E - 6( 0 . 7 6 ) - 4 . 0 9 E - 6  ( - 0 . 3 2 ) 0 . 2 0 2 7(4 2 ) 0 . 1 5 9 6( 1 1 0 )
0 . 0 4 8 0( 7 . 3 2 ) 0 . 0 1 1 3  ( 0 . 9 7 ) 3 . 8 6 E - 6  ( 0 . 7 2 ) - 1 . 1 7 E - 5( - 1 . 0 6 )
0 . 0 6 7 3( 1 1 . 0 3 ) 0 . 0 2 5 1( 2 . 1 6 ) 1 . 2 0 E - 5( 1 . 9 9 ) - 1 . 8 4 E - 5( - 1 . 2 0 )
D O W 0 . 0 3 3 8  ( 1 0 . 7 8 ) 0 . 0 2 1 9  ( 4 . 0 1 ) - 4 . 0 5 E - 7  ( - 0 . 8 2 ) - 5 . 4 5 E - 6  ( - 1 . 1 5 ) 0 . 1 1 5 1  ( 1 9 5 ) 0 . 1 0 4 7  ( 4 9 0  )
0 . 0 3 0 6  ( 1 0 . 2 6  ) 0 . 0 1 9 8  ( 3 . 9 6 ) - 3 . 9  8 E - 7  ( - 0 . 9 5 ) - 4 . 8 3 E - 6  ( - 1 . 4 2 )
0 . 0 4 8 6( 1 4 . 6 7 ) 0 . 0 1 8 6  ( 3 . 5 8 ) 2 . 9 4 E - 7  ( 0 . 3 3 ) - 2 . 2 7 E - 6  ( 0 . 5 6 )
F 0 . 0 4 1 0  ( 2 1 . 9 8 ) - 0 . 0 0 0 7  ( - 0 . 2 5 ) - 4 . 0 2 E - 7  ( - 0 . 3 1 ) - 4 . 7 8 E - 6  ( - 2 . 4 1 ) 0 . 0 9 6 3  ( 2 3 5 ) 0 . 0 9 5 4  ( 3 8 0 )
0 . 0 3 7 5  ( 1 7 . 0 5 ) - 0 . 0 0 1 9  ( - 0 . 6 4 ) - 1 . 3 2 E - 6( - 0 . 9 4 ) - 3 . 3 6 E - 6  ( - 1 . 5 9 )
0 . 0 4 6 4( 2 7 . 2 7 ) 0 . 0 0 2 7  ( 1 . 1 2 ) - 9 . 4 4 E - 7  ( - 0 . 7 8 ) - 2 . 3 8 E - 6  ( - 1 . 2 3 )
3 T h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  is c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e a c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e c o r d  u s e d  i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s e s .  T h e  v a l u e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  a r e  s u b p e r i o d  a n d  t o t a l  s a m p l e  s i z e s .
Table VII
(Cont inued)
F i r m Pi (3 2 Pi P(
A v e r a g e  Q u o t e d  S p r e a d  ( - 1 2 , - 1 1 )  ( T o t a l )
F T X 0 . 0 2 5 9  ( 2 7  . 9 6 ) 0 . 0 0 7 1( 4 . 8 5 ) - 1 . 5 1 E - 7( - 0 . 4 8 ) - 1 . 0 8 E - 6( - 1 . 6 7 ) 0 . 0 9 0 4  ( 3 8 6  ) 0 . 0 7 4 8  ( 9 8 0 )
0 . 0 2 4 3  ( 2 4 . 9 0 ) 0 . 0 0 4 1( 2 . 5 9 ) - 2 . 8 9 E - 7  ( - 0 . 8 1 ) - 8 . 2 8 E - 7  ( - 1 . 1 5 )
0 . 0 3 2 9  ( 3 9  . 9 9  ) 0 . 0 0 9 1  ( 7 . 0 6 ) - 3 . 9 1 E - 8  ( - 0 . 1 3 ) - 9 . 2 7 E - 7  ( - 1 . 6 7 )
G E 0 . 0 4 6 1( 2 1 . 5 7 ) 0 . 0 0 4 3( 0 . 9 8 ) - 1 . 0 0 E - 6  ( - 1 . 9 1 ) 9 . 3 0 E - 7  ( 1 . 5 3 ) 0 . 1 5 7 3  ( 1 5 1 ) 0 . 1 3 0 2  ( 5 5 5 )
0 . 0 4 0 3  ( 1 7 . 8 5 ) 0 . 0 0 0 0( 0 . 0 1 ) - 8 . 8 0 E - 7  ( - 1 . 5 7 ) 7 . 6 3 E - 7  ( 1 . 2 9 )
0 . 0 6 3 6  ( 3 3 . 2 9 ) 0 . 0 1 4 9  ( 3 . 7 9 ) - 1 . 1 2 E - 6  ( - 2 . 9 0 ) 1 . 2 4 E - 6  ( 2 . 3 2 )
G L W 0 . 0 4 7 6  ( 7 . 3 7 ) 0 . 0 3 1 7  ( 4 . 0 5 ) 5 . 3 4 E - 7( 0 . 2 1 ) - 1 . 1 0 E - 6( - 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 2 4 0 1  ( 3 0 2 ) 0 . 2 1 9 5  ( 4 4 8  )
0.0420( 5 . 8 8 ) 0 . 0 2 1 7  ( 2 . 5 8 ) 5 . 8 0 E - 7  ( 0 . 2 2 ) - 1 . 5 2 E - 6( - 0 . 5 3 )
0 . 0 7 5 1( 1 0 . 3 8 ) 0 . 0 3 8 3( 4 . 5 1 ) - 2 . 5 4 E - 8  ( - 0 . 0 1 ) - 8 . 8 4 E - 8  ( - 0 . 0 3 )
G W F 0 . 0 2 3 5  ( 3 . 3 8 ) 0 . 0 3 2 4( 3 . 7 0 ) 4 . 8 0 E - 6  ( 0 . 8 2 ) - 5 . 3 6 E - 6  ( - 0 . 8 2 ) 0 . 1 4 8 0( 3 8 ) 0 . 1 2 1 5  ( 88  )
0 . 0 2 1 4( 3 . 0 9 ) 0 . 0 2 9 4( 3 . 1 2 ) 2 . 1 6 E - 6( 0 . 4 2 ) - 2 . 2 8 E - 6  ( - 0 . 3 6 )
0 . 0 3 8 9  ( 5 . 6 5 ) 0 . 0 3 4 8( 3 . 9 6 ) 9 . 0 7 E - 6  ( 1 . 5 8 ) - 8 . 6 6 E - 6  ( - 1 . 3 6 )
3 T h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e a c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e c o r d  u s e d  i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s e s .  T h e  v a l u e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  a r e  s u b p e r i o d  a n d  t o t a l  s a m p l e  s i z e s .
Table VII
(Confc inued)
F i r m (3 j 133 (34
A v e r a g e  Q u o t e d  S p r e a d  ( - 1 2 , - 1 1 )  ( T o t a l )
I P 0 . 0 1 6 0( 2 . 6 2 ) 0 . 0 6 1 6( 8 . 1 6 ) - 4 . 0  2 E - 7  ( - 0 . 2 9 ) 1 . 8 1 E - 7( 0 . 1 2 ) 0 . 2 2 3 6  ( 2 0 8  ) 0 . 1 7 7 5  ( 2 9 9  )
0 . 0 1 5 8  ( 2 . 3 1 ) 0 . 0 5 2 5( 6 . 4 6 ) - 3 . 9 7 E - 7  ( - 0 . 2 5 ) - 1 . 5 2 E - 8  ( - 0 . 0 1 )
0 . 0 3 1 1  ( 5 . 1 2 ) 0 . 0 8 4 3( 1 2 . 0 0 ) - 1 . 0 4 E - 6( - 0 . 7 6 ) 8 . 4 8 E - 7  ( 0 . 5 3 )
M M M 0 . 0 7 3 8  ( 1 6 . 2 1 ) 0 . 0 1 9 4  ( 2 . 4 2 ) - 2 . 9  O E - 7  ( - 0 . 2 0 ) - 2 . 6 7 E - 6  ( - 0 . 5 6 ) 0 . 2 3 4 1  ( 1 5 7 ) 0 . 2 0 2 6  ( 4 3 0 )
0 . 0 6 9 2( 1 4 . 6 2 ) 0 . 0 1 0 9  ( 1 . 3 3 ) - 1 . 9 7 E - 7( - 0 . 1 3 ) - 2 . 8 8 E - 6  ( - 0 . 6 7 )
0 . 0 9 7 7( 2 3 . 5 4 ) 0 . 0 3 2 8( 4 . 4 1 ) 4 . 9 7 E - 8  ( 0 . 0 4 ) 7 . 1 3 E - 7( 0 . 1 4 )
M R K 0 . 1 2 6 4( 1 5 . 7 7 ) 0 . 0 1 4 3( 1 . 2 5 ) 9 . 9 9 E - 7  ( 0 . 1 0 ) 1 . 6 5 E - 7  ( 0 . 0 2 )
♦
0 . 4 5 4 8  ( 2 7 4  ) 0 . 4 2 6 4  ( 4 5 7 )
0 . 1 0 1 8( 1 2 . 3 5 ) 0 . 0 1 2 7  ( 1 . 0 7 ) - 3 . 6 3 E - 6  ( - 0 . 3 2 ) 4 . 5 3 E - 6  ( 0 . 3 9 )
0 . 1 9 3 6  ( 2 7 . 8 3 ) 0 . 0 2 9 3  ( 2 . 9 6 ) - 6 . 4 0 E - 6  ( - 0 . 6 5 ) 7 . 2 7 E - 6  ( 0 . 7 2 )
T 0 . 0 3 6 7  ( 1 6 . 0 3 ) 0 . 0 0 6 2  ( 2 . 1 8 ) - 7 . 9 7 E - 7  ( - 1 . 0 8 ) 5 . 7 0 E - 7  ( 0 . 7 3 ) 0 . 1 0 7 1( 7 5 1 ) 0 . 1 0 0 6( 1 1 3 1 )
0 . 0 3 3 7  ( 1 5 . 0 7 ) 0 . 0 0 4 7  ( 1 . 6 8 ) - 7 . 3 5 E - 7  ( - 1 . 1 3 ) 5 . 4 8 E - 7  ( 0 . 8 1 )
0 . 0 4 7 9( 1 9 . 8 6 ) 0 . 0 0 2 9  ( 1 . 0 0 ) - 2 . 0 6 E - 7  ( - 0 . 1 7 ) 1 . 9 4 E - 7  ( 0 . 1 5 )
3 T h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  is  c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t l y -  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  e a c h  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e c o r d  u s e d  i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s e s .  T h e  v a l u e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s  a r e  s u b p e r i o d  a n d  t o t a l  s a m p l e  s i z e s .
Table VIII
A v e r a g e  R e l a t i v e  B i d - A s k  S p r e a d s 3 ( A v e r a g e  P r i c e  i n  P a r e n t h e s e s )
F i r m ( - 1 2 ,  - 1 1 ) ( - 2 ,  - 1 ,  0) (+ 2 ,  + 3 )
A H S 0 . 2 8 5 0 0 . 1 4 6 7 0 . 1 1 3 8( 0 . 3 8 1 ) ( 1 . 0 0 0 ) ( 1 . 7 1 6 )A P A 0 . 1 4 3 3 0 . 1 5 4 2 0 . 2 8 2 3( 1 . S 2 3 ) ( 0 . 7 9 6 ) ( 0 . 4 7 4 )A V P 0 . 0 9 7 5 0 . 1 1 4 3 0 . 1 4 6 8( 0 . 8 6 1 ) ( 1 . 1 2 4 ) ( 0 . 5 8 5 )B A 0 . 1 0 8 1 0 . 1 4 3 2 0 . 4 2 1 7( 1 . 2 0 5 ) ( 0 . 5 7 9 ) ( 0 . 1 8 9 )B A C 0 . 1 4 0 4 0 . 1 2 9 1 0 . 1 6 2 9( 2 . 3 4 4 ) ( 0 . 6 7 4 ) ( 0 . 4 7 1 )B A X 0 . 1 8 0 4 0 . 0 8 1 5 0 . 0 8 8 4( 2 . 0 4 1 ) ( 3 . 0 4 4 ) ( 2 . 2 0 3 )B M Y 0 . 1 4 2 4 0 . 1 1 7 0 0 . 1 3 6 0( 1 . 6 9 4 ) ( 1 . 4 6 1 ) ( 1 . 2 9 3 )B N  I 0 . 0 6 4 2 0 . 0 5 9 5 0 . 0 6 3 7( 6 . 7 9 1 ) ( 4 . 3 9 7  ) ( 4 . 4 2 8 )C L 0 . 0 9 8 8 0 . 0 6 4 9 0 . 1 0 5 0( 2 . 3 4 8 ) ( 3 . 3 4 5 ) ( 2 . 8 9 7 )C S C 0 . 2 2 7 2 0 . 2 0 6 6 0 . 1 2 1 9( 0 . 8 9 2 ) ( 0 . 7 0 0 ) ( 1 . 1 4 7 )D O W 0 . 1 1 9 5 0 . 1 2 4 1 0 . 2 0 8 7( 0 . 9 6 3 ) ( 0 . 7 9 2 ) ( 0 . 4 6 9 )F 0 . 0 7 0 8 0 . 0 8 9 5 0 . 0 8 5 0( 1 . 3 6 0 ) ( 1 . 2 6 2 ) ( 1 . 1 0 6 )F T X 0 . 0 8 9 7 0 . 2 0 6 3 0 . 1 5 7 4( 1 . 0 0 8 ) ( 0 . 3 3 3 ) ( 0 . 4 1 1 )G E 0 . 0 9 3 3 0 . 1 3 7 9 0 . 0 8 5 4( 1 . 6 8 6 ) ( 0 . 7 6 2 ) ( 1 . 4 0 6  )G L W 0 . 1 2 3 8 0 . 1 6 9 4 0 . 1 5 6 5( 1 . 9 4 2 ) ( 1 . 0 0 0 ) ( 1 . 1 2 7 )G W F 0 . 1 1 4 0 0 . 2 4 2 4 0 . 3 2 4 7( 1 . 2 9 8 ) ( 0 . 3 9 4 ) ( 0 . 3 1 2 )I P 0 . 1 4 8 4 0 . 1 9 2 1 0 . 1 2 9 9( 1 . 5 0 7 ) ( 0 . 5 9 5 ) ( 0 . 5 5 5 )M M M 0 . 1 2 7 2 0 . 0 7 8 7 0 . 0 5 8 5( 1 . 8 4 1 ) ( 2 . 2 3 5 ) ( 3 . 1 5 5 )M R K 0 . 0 6 5 3 0 . 0 8 7 9 0 . 0 6 7 5( 6 . 9 6 8 ) ( 5 . 1 7 9  ) ( 5 . 9 0 8 )T 0 . 0 7 1 5 0 . 0 7 8 0 0 . 0 9 0 9( 1 . 4 9 7 ) ( 1 . 4 3 5 ) ( 0 . 9 6 6 )
3 T h e  a v e r a g e  r e l a t i v e  s p r e a d  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  b y  d i v i d i n g  t h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  d u r i n g  t h e  s a m p l e  p e r i o d  b y  t h e  b a s e  o p t i o n ' s  a v e r a g e  p r i c e  d u r i n g  t h e  s a m p l e  p e r i o d .
D e v i a t i o n o f  E s t i m a t e d  
( D a y s  -
T a b l e  I X  
S p r e a d  F r o m  A v e r a g e  
2, - 1 ,  0, +2, + 3 )
Q u o t e d  S p r e a d
M L E W L S O L S
R o o t  M S E a 0 . 0 5 9 2 0 . 0 7 6 4 0 . 0 2 3 3
% R o o t  M S E b 0 . 3 0 4 7 0 . 4 9 6 5 0 . 1 5 1 5
(D a y s - 1 2 ,  - 1 1 ,  + 2 ,  + 3 )
M L E W L S O L S
R o o t  M S E 3 0 . 0 8 8 2 0 . 1 0 4 7 0 . 0 4 8 2
%  R o o t  M S E b 0 . 4 8 8 1 0 . 5 7 9 4 0 . 2 6 6 7
a T h e  R o o t  M S E  is b a s e d  o n  t h e  s p r e a d  e s t i m a t e  2(31 a n d  t h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d  o v e r  t h e  e n t i r e  s a m p l e  p e r i o d .
b T h e  % R o o t  M S E  is  c a l c u l a t e d  b y  d i v i d i n g  R o o t  M S E  b y  t h e  a v e r a g e  o f  t h e  a v e r a g e  q u o t e d  s p r e a d s  r e p o r t e d  i n  T a b l e s  II  a n d  I I I .
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